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Privatization of Department of Defense utility systems has become a central 
issue. It is seen as a way to relieve the Services of their current burden of huge 
maintenance and repair backlogs for aging systems. This thesis performs an 
economic analysis to determine whether it is economically feasible to privatize the 
Jacksonville Military Complex's potable water distribution systems. To address this 
issue, current legislation affecting utilities privatization was studied. Interviews were 
conducted with representatives of the Army, Navy, and Air Force regarding their 
current utilities privatization efforts. A case study of NA VWEPSTA Earle was used 
to provide the framework in which the Jacksonville decision should be made. Data 
was gathered from NAS Jacksonville, NAS Cecil Field, and NAVSTA Mayport to 
calculate their annual water consumptions and the current plant value of their water 
systems. The systems' current plant value was obtained from NA VFAC's P-164 and 
adjusted for accumulated depreciation to provide the net current cost of the systems. 
These figures were used to derive the net present value of both the status quo scenario and 
the privatization scenario. Based upon the net present value calculations, privatization 
of the systems is recommended. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether or not it is economically beneficial 
for the Government to privatize the potable water distribution systems of the Jacksonville 
Military Complex. For purposes of this thesis, the Jacksonville Military Complex includes 
Naval Air Station (NAS) Jacksonville, NAS Cecil Field, and Naval Station (NA VSTA) 
Mayport, all located in Northern Florida. A case study of Naval Weapons Station 
(NA VWEPSTA) Earle, New Jersey is utilized to provide a framework in which to analyze 
the decision of whether or not to privatize the potable water distribution systems on these 
three Florida bases. NA VWEPSTA Earle was chosen as it is one of the few Navy bases on 
which a privatization study of the potable water distribution system has been completed. 
Appropriate privatization legislation will be reviewed so that the reader is familiar with the 
Department of Defense's (DoD) current utilities privatization efforts. General background 
will be provided regarding the drivers of the current privatization movement. 
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
A simple definition of privatization is " ... to transfer production of Government 
services to private firms (Fisher, 1996, p. 163)." An expanded definition and discussion of 
privatization is found in Chapters II and III. Privatization, the concept or decision, includes 
both political and economic criteria and currently requires Congressional approval. 
Economically, Congress will not approve a privatization proposal if an economic analysis 
does not support this decision. (Statement of Work Public Works Center Jacksonville, 
Florida: Cost of Service Study and Economic Analysis, June 11, 1996) The DoD is 
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analyzing its "core function" to determine those services that are " ... not essential to the 
conduct of its inherent functions" and therefore are candidates for privatization (Whitta, 
1996). 
There are numerous methods available to achieve privatization and multiple degrees 
to which a service may be privatized, ranging from outsourcing (the Government contracts 
for the services) to full divestiture of the assets that the Government was utilizing to provide 
the good or service. (Stroup, 1994, p. 558) 
Public Financing Private Financing 
Public Production 1 2 
Private Production 4 3 
Figure 1. Categories of Service 
Figure 1. illustrates the four fundamental ways services may be categorized, 
depending upon the source of production and financing. A service is considered to be 
publicly produced if it is provided by the Government. A service is considered to be 
financed publicly if it receives its revenue from the Government, i.e. through taxation or 
borrowing. Services typically thought of as Government functions, such as national defense, 
lie in quadrant 1. (Stiglitz, 1988, pp. 131, 146) 
Some of the goods and services found in quadrant 1 are considered to be public 
goods, but not all publicly funded and produced goods and services are public goods in the 
2 
economic sense. In the economic sense, public goods are defined to exist when the market 
fails to supply goods in sufficient quantity to meet demand. Public goods have two critical 
properties. First it is not feasible to exclude any individual from enjoying the good. (Stiglitz, 
1988, pp. 119-120) An example of this is clean air, for which it would be infeasible to bill 
(Nutt & Backoff, 1992, p. 2). Everyone enjoys the benefits of clean air, regardless of 
whether or not they are willing to pay for the good. Hence, the free rider problem exists. A 
second critical property of a public good is that it is not desirable to exclude any individual. 
Consumption is nonrival and cost is not increased for an additional individual to enjoy the 
benefits. An example of this is navigational aids, such as buoys or a lighthouse. There is 
no cost for an additional sailor to use one of these aids. (Stiglitz, 1988, pp. 7 4-7 5, 119-120) 
The notion of public goods is important when considering implementing privatization 
schemes. 
Quadrant 2 describes those services which are publicly produced, but paid for 
privately. The U.S. Postal Service is an example of such a service. It is constitutionally 
mandated and employees are federal employees. However, individuals pay for the mail 
delivery services they desire on a fee-for-service basis. (Stiglitz, 1988, p. 179) Quadrant 3 
illustrates those goods typically considered to be private. A pentium computer is an example 
of a private good. It is produced by a private company such as International Business 
Machine (IBM) or Microsoft and it is financed through consumer purchases. The decision 
maker knows his preferences and the value the item has to him. (Stiglitz, 1988, pp. 146-147) 
The Government is still involved in quadrant 3 goods and services because it provides 
industry regulatory guidance and taxes the transactions (Stiglitz, 1988, p. 2). In quadrant 4 
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goods are produced privately, but financed publicly. For example, the Government 
purchases items, ranging from weapons systems to office equipment, from the private sector. 
The goal of privatization is to move services currently performed in quadrant 1 into 
the other quadrants (Stiglitz, 1988, p. 26). The degree of privatization will shift from 
quadrant 2 through 4. This thesis will consider shifting services into each of these three 
quadrants. Case studies of the Government's potable water distribution systems on four 
military bases will be analyzed to discover in which quadrant the public interest is best 
served. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis analyzes the primary question - Is it economically beneficial for DoD to 
privatize the potable water distribution systems of the Jacksonville Military Complex? To 
answer this primary question, five subsidiary questions will be studied: 
1. What are the circumstances in the public sector that give rise to 
privatization? 
2. What are the major impediments to privatization? 
3. What role does Congress play in privatization? 
4.What are the costs/benefits of privatizing the potable water distribution 
systems for Naval Weapons Station (NA VWEPSTA) Earle? 
5. How do the costs of outsourcing the potable water distribution systems for 
the Jacksonville Military Complex compare to the costs of privatization? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
An extensive literature review of the background of the current privatization 
movement was performed. Chapter IT focuses on the inefficiencies of the public sector which 
make privatization desirable. Chapter ill highlights DoD's current privatization policies, 
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initiatives, and the impediments to these efforts. Chapter N provides a synopsis of a 
privatization study performed by a private contractor, C. H. Guernsey & Company, on the 
potable water distribution system of NA VWEPST A Earle, New Jersey. This case study 
provides a framework of the types of costs and benefits associated with privatizing a potable 
water distribution system. This framework of types of costs is applied to the potable water 
distribution systems of the Jacksonville Military Complex to determine whether or not 
privatization is in the best interest of the Government. In choosing two different sites for 
this thesis, a diverse base will amplify and illustrate some of the driving factors of the 
privatization decision. Chapter VI offers conclusions, recommendations, and areas for 
further study. 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS 
The main thrust of the thesis study is to analyze whether or not it is economically 
beneficial for the Navy to privatize the potable water distribution systems for the 
Jacksonville Military Complex. Privatization is presented as an alternative to the rising costs 
of maintaining the military's infrastructure. However, there are numerous unknowns in the 
privatization forecasting model, including specifics to each geographic location. The major 
impediments to privatization, including Congressional involvement in this process, are 
reviewed to provide the guidelines in which the privatization decision will be made. As 
utilities privatization is a relatively new concept to DoD, little historical data exists 
concerning the long run economic costs or benefits. The Navy, Army, and Air Force are 
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currently conducting studies into the feasibility of numerous privatization projects ranging 
from potable water distribution systems to Child Development Centers and Family Housing. 
6 
II. PUBLIC SECTOR INEFFICIENCIES -A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF 
PRIVATIZATION 
Although the concept of privatization can be traced back to the end of World War I 
(Cole, 1988, p. 11), it did not gain its current momentum until the 1980s under Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher in England and President Ronald Reagan in the United States 
(Stroup, 1994, p. 558). " 'The role of Government should not include performing services 
and activities that can effectively be carried out by the private sector,' said President Reagan 
in 1983 (Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 224)." The privatization movement is forcing Government to 
analyze its roles and methods for fulfilling them. The goal of privatization is to place heavier 
reliance upon the private sector. "A Government able to delegate the implementation of its 
policy goals finds itself with fewer administrative chores, and more time and resources to 
devote to its primary task - making sound and just laws in response to the popular will 
(Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 299)." 
A. THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
"Government is a social contract between citizens (Savas, 1982, p. 1)." Its power is 
supplied by the willing consent of the governed. As stated in the Declaration of 
Independence, the original goal of the United States Government was to enable its citizens 
to enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In order to provide these inalienable rights 
to its citizenry, the Government performs certain roles. As specified by one author, E. S. 
Savas, these roles include building the nation and integrating its parts, allocating the costs 
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and benefits of change and progress, correcting the major abuses of business, alleviating 
human problems, and improving the lot of the populace. (Savas, 1982, p. 2) 
Currently, the Government performs numerous functions to achieve its mission. 
Economists view the primary mission to be " ... to provide the legal framework within which 
all economic transactions occur (Stiglitz, 1988, p. 24)." In accomplishing that mission, the 
Government's functions may be divided into four categories and related to the matrix 
regarding public or private, fmancing or production, shown in Chapter I, Figure 1. The first 
category pertains to the production of goods and services, ranging from the quadrant 1 
service, national defense, to the quadrant 2 service, the U.S. Postal Service. The second 
function concerns Government's influence on the private sector due to regulation and 
subsidization of private producers. This area includes regulating the mergers of large 
companies to prevent the creation of a monopoly, a quadrant 3 service, and providing farm 
subsidies, a quadrant 4 service. The third category deals with the redistribution of income 
and provision of social insurance to its citizens. An example of redistribution of income is 
welfare, a quadrant 1 service. Medicare, a quadrant 4 function, is an example of social 
insurance. The fourth area of Government responsibility is concerned with the purchase of 
goods and services as resources needed to conduct internal business, such as weapon systems 
procurement from private industry, a quadrant 4 function. (Stiglitz, 1988, p. 24) 
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B. POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN PUBLIC SECTOR RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION DECISIONS 
The term public means "of the people (Nutt & Backoff, 1992, p. 25)." Most of the 
heads of public institutions are elected or, appointed by someone who is elected. These 
insitution heads are held accountable either to the entire constituency of voters, if elected, 
or to a collection of elected officials, if appointed. "Unlike a private firm owner, a 
bureaucrat does not own property rights to future increases in the value of the agency or to 
its reputation after he leaves it. .. Thus, the bureaucrat has an incentive to make decisions that 
enlarge the agency's size and output only during his tenure at the agency (Johnson, 1991, p. 
289)." In contrast, a private frrm's board of directors represent the interests of the owners 
of the frrm, who will realize both the full benefits of good decision making as well as the full 
costs of bad decisions made by the management. What determines whether or not a manager 
is judged to be a success in a private firm is " ... how well you run the place (Blumenthal, 
1979, p. 26)." 
1. No Economic Bottom Line 
In Government, there is no such economic measurement: 
There is no acceptable yardstick to measure the value of most bureaucratic 
output. .. This ... produces uncertainty and gives bureaucrats and legislators 
considerable flexibility in determining 'social needs' ... Bureaucrats are 
motivated by promotions, power, prestige, perks, influence, reputation ... The 
unwritten but most important mission of the senior bureaucrat is to expand 
the agency. (Johnson, 1991, pp. 286-287) 
These motivations arise because of the political market failures which reward public sector 
managers by noneconomic criteria such as " ... the size of their agencies: the number of 
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employees and the dollar amount of their budget (Goodman, 1985, -P· 116)," and their 
influence over decision making (Blumenthal, 1979, p. 24). 
Another aspect of Government which differentiates it from the business sector is its 
rights of compulsion (Stiglitz, 1988, p. 9). Unlike institutions in the private sector, the 
Government may force citizens to pay taxes and abide by its rules and regulations, curtailing 
the benefits of competition in the supply of publicly provided goods and services (Stiglitz, 
1988, p. 9). A private organization does not possess compulsion authority. Shareholders 
ate interested in the company's growth and profitability. They invest of their own free will 
and may transfer their economic support to a competing interest at any time they wish. The 
economic market drives private enterprise, while the diverse views of politics drive the 
public sector. (Blumenthal, 1979, p. 28) "At the theoretical level the political market 
does have a measure of overall performance, which is equivalent to profits in the private 
sector. This measure is votes." (Johnson, 1991, p. 286) However, votes cannot be used as 
an incentive for bureaucrats. Civil service jobs are not linked to votes. Also, it is difficult 
to quantify an individual's contribution toward receipt of votes for those elected or appointed 
positions which depend upon votes. (Johnson, 1991, p. 286) 
2. Nature of Federal Employee Incentives 
"Many federal organizations are also monopolies, with few incentives to innovate or 
improve. Employees have virtual lifetime tenure, regardless of their performance. Success 
offers few rewards; failure, few penalties." (Gore, 1993, p. 3) People are encouraged to 
perform by incentives (Nutt & Backoff, 1992, pp. 48-49). However, Government has 
insulated employees from the power of economic incentives (Gore, 1993, p. 43). Many 
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Government decisions are made on political grounds, while private sector managers feel the 
incentive provided by profit margin and tend to base their decisions on economic factors, 
related to the market (Pririe, 1985, p. 13). 
The source of bureaucratic problems lies not in the bureaucrats but in the 
nature of public goods and the incentives, controls, and institutions existing 
in the bureaucracy ... Bureaucrats have the same weaknesses, strengths, 
abilities, and values as workers in private industry. (Johnson, 1991, p. 281) 
"The problem is not lazy or incompetent people; it is red tape and regulation so suffocating 
that they stifle every ounce of creativity. Today's primary issue is how Government works 
(Gore, 1993, p. 2)." 
It has been assumed that Government employees are individually inspired by their 
mission of public service as soundly as profit motivates the private sector (Pririe, 1985, p. 
6). Thus, an illusion that the public sector is "different in kind" and entitled to a different 
standard of evaluation has been created (Pririe, 1985, p. 6). This different standard may still 
be applied to inherently Governmental functions, such as national defense. However, today' s 
generally shared belief is that the Government should be held to the same standards as 
industry when performing similar, noninherent Governmental functions, such as potable 
water service. (Pririe, 1985, p. 7) 
C. PUBLIC SECTOR PRODUCTION INEFFICIENCY 
"In the name of controlling waste, we have created paralyzing inefficiency. It's time 
we found a way to get rid of waste and encourage efficiency (Gore, 1993, p. 3)." Due to the 
political influences and production inefficiency found in the public sector, arguments have 
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been made that " ... 'Government should spend more time governing and less time providing, 
should either purchase services from the private sector or, simply, stop 
producing'(Fitzgerald, 1988, pp. 7-8)." Privatization of noncore functions will enable the 
Government to focus on governing. Many issues weigh into the privatization decision, 
ranging from economics to changing people's attitudes and from impact on mission to 
implementation concerns (Savas, 1987, p.289). Political and social externalities must also 
factor into the privatization decision for it to be successful. (Goodman, 1985, p. 34) The 
following sections will consider two areas of public sector production inefficiency, costs and 
decision making. 
1. Costs 
"Competition and profit incentives are far stronger efficiency tools than any 
bureaucratic management ploy, except perhaps the threat of death, that Government has ever 
devised (Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 18)." Studies have shown that whether a service is provided 
publicly or privately proves to be of secondary importance to whether or not it is delivered 
under competition (Goodman, 1985, p. 117). 
Competitive bidding by profit-maximizing firms for a well-specified output 
guarantees that the product will be produced at the lowest cost. The absence 
of competition and profit incentives in the public sector is not likely to result 
in cost minimization. (Fisher, 1996, p. 165) 
Study after study arrive at the same conclusion: public sector costs of production are 
much higher than those found in private industry (Pririe, 1985, p. 8). "It appears that market-
induced pressures to keep costs down and profits up act as a better discipline on the private 
sector than does the desire for economy on the public sector (Pririe, 1985, p. 9)." 
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Costs are also higher in public organizations as a consequence of the public sector's 
monopoly, since it is more vulnerable to the pressures which increase costs, namely 
restrictive work practices. (Pririe, 1985, p.1 0) "The public sector shows an immunity to cost 
controls (Pririe, 1985, p. 15)." The Government may raise or lower its budget and, in turn, 
its revenue, with taxes (Pririe, 1985, p. 15). Public sector expenses consist of a variety of 
factors, some of which the Government can not control (Pririe, 1985, p. 16). "Groups which 
benefit from public operations form vociferous and effective lobby groups with high media 
visibility and the power to sap the will of an economy-minded administration (Pririe, 1985, 
p. 16)." Thus, it is difficult for Government to match the cost-cutting which private industry 
achieves (Pririe, 1985, p. 9). 
Cost savings are to be reaped when a service is provided at the most efficient level 
(Goodman, 1985, pp. 116-117). Many Government services are duplicative (Gore, 1993, 
p. 94). The Education Department funded 230 programs, many of which overlapped, when 
the National Performance Review was conducted in 1993 (Gore, 1993, p. 100). This review 
recommended reduction of the number of programs and streamlining their procedures. 
Privatization of a service " ... can take the service into the purely economic world and out of 
the political world (Pririe, 1985, p. 2)." 
2. Decision Making 
The Government is managed by the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches of 
Government, a balance created in the Constitution. To accomplish a goal, interest groups 
and lobbyists must be rallied to the politician's side, get the backing of coalitions, and build 
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alliances through compromise on other issues (Goodman, 1985, pp. 31-34). No one 
has ultimate authority over decision making. (Levine, 1990, pp. 52-54) 
There's nothing inherent in a bureaucrat that makes him less efficient. It's 
the way the system is structured ... In the Government no one has the power to 
decide that this is the policy he wants to develop, these are the people who 
are going to develop it, this is how it's going to be decided, and these are the 
folks who are going to administer it. No one, not even the President, has that 
kind of power. (Blumenthal, 1979 pp. 28, 30) 
As Michael Blumenthal discovered while he was Secretary of the Treasury, a large number 
of players is required to accomplish anything (Blumenthal, 1979, p. 30). As Blumenthal 
stated: "Nothing can be kept secret. Everyone feels he has a legitimate interest and must be 
in the loop. Thus, the difficulty of making decisions in the public sector is compounded 
(Blumenthal, 1979, p. 30)." 
... (E)ach time you have an administrative decision to make, which increases 
efficiency or which starts a new policy, you have to ask yourself, is that 
decision more important than the decision ... on the budget? Is it worthwhile 
to get adverse publicity in the newspapers, or get into a fight with 
Congressman X, over that issue, or should I not keep my good will so that I 
can use my credit with those people on the big things? (Blumenthal, 1979, 
p. 26) 
Consumers have some control over private organizations as they may decide whether 
to buy a company's products or to seek satisfaction elsewhere (Pririe, 1985, p. 11). Private 
goods and services are oriented toward consumer satisfaction (Pririe, 1985, p. 11). ''Too 
many agencies have learned to overlook their customers. After all, most of Government's 
customers can't really take their business elsewhere (Gore, 1993, p. 44)." This lack of 
competition creates a situation in which the public sector tends to become producer-oriented 
(Pririe, 1985, p. 12). Aim shifts from the customer to the worker; the provision of jobs 
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becoming paramount. "It is sadly ironic that private businesses are more under the control 
of the general public than those businesses which are 'publicly owned' (Pririe, 1985, p. 12)." 
Many federal organizations are also monopolies ... customers are captive; they 
can't walk away from the air traffic control system or the Internal Revenue 
Service and sign up with a competitor. Worse, most federal monopolies 
receive their money without any direct input from their customers. 
Consequently, they try a lot harder to please Congressional appropriations 
subcommittees than the people they are meant to serve. Taxpayers pay more 
than they should and get poorer service. (Gore, 1993, p. 3) 
The National Performance Review was conducted " ... to make Government work 
better and cost less (Gore, 1993, p. 1)." The policy of privatization can give consumers 
choice and input (Pririe, 1985, pp. 24-25). "It can leave capital spending and price decision 
free to be determined by straightforward economic logic, instead of by an anticipation of 
what the public might tolerate (Pririe, 1985, p. 25)." 
D. EVENTS FAVORING PRIVATIZATION 
Although privatization is not a new concept, it is a quiet revolution which has 
recently started to gain attention. "Philosophy borne of suspicion for big Government may 
underlie this revolution in America, but necessity is the mother of privatization (Fitzgerald, 
1988, p. 20)." Two primary catalysts have spurred the current drive to privatize. They have 
created today' s environment of change, which has fostered the rapid spread and acceptance 
of this movement. 
1. Decrease of the Federal Discretionary Budget 
A primary change agent supporting new ways of doing business is the decrease of the 
discretionary portion of the Federal budget. The Federal debt is rising because mandatory 
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spending for programs such as Medicare and Social Security is increasing. The discretionary 
portion of the budget can offset this growth in mandatory spending. Domestic discretionary 
spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) has decreased from 4.7 percent in 1980 
to 3.5 percent in 1995. (Congressional Budget Office, 1996, p. 141) One of the 
consequences of the constraints placed on the discretionary portion of the Federal budget has 
been renewed effort to fmd efficiencies in Government. Questions are being asked such as, 
"Must we tolerate costly, inefficient bureaucracies unresponsive to our wishes, or can we 
better address social priorities by harnessing the power of the marketplace to deliver a wider 
range of options and solutions (Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 17)?" The public has become 
increasingly disillusioned with Government. (sic.) "Only 20 percent of Americans trust the 
federal Government to do the right thing most of the time-down from 7 6 percent 30 years ago 
(Gore, 1993, p. 1)." "Our Government is in trouble. It has lost its sense of mission; it has 
lost its ethic of public service; and, most importantly, it has lost the faith of the American 
people (Gore, 1993, p. 9)." In his book, When Government Goes Private, Fitzgerald asks: 
Are the bureaucratic structures of Government constituted to tax us arbitrarily 
to finance whichever interest groups happen to exercise the most political 
influence, providing unlimited services on demand, or is the role of 
Government more properly to insure that only essential services are provided, 
with Government acting as the facilitator of delivery rather than as the 
provider? (Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 17) 
This budget decrease has placed pressure on agencies to explore new avenues of 
doing business and to reassess their appropriate role and how they might best allocate their 
scarce resources. Today, public sector managers are searching for ways to ensure quality 
services are provided to the public in the most economic manner. The competition 
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associated with privatization has enabled public sector managers to achieve some of the 
savings needed. "It is in service delivery that competition yields results-because competition 
is the one force that gives public agencies no choice but to improve." (Gore, 1993, p. 55) 
2. Single World Economy 
Another pressure to privatize comes from the emerging single world economy 
(Linowes, 1988, p. 245). Advanced technology has virtually removed all barriers to world 
trade and has created a single world economy. ''The most important force favoring a 
prominent future for privatization is the rapid pace with which a single world economy is 
developing and the intense competitive pressures thereby being created on each nation to 
rationalize its economic system." (Linowes, 1988, p. 245) 
This intense world competition is forcing the private sector to become more efficient 
and effective or go out of business. If a product can be made cheaper in another nation, 
companies are moving their production facilities to that nation. If another company offers 
a similar (substitute) product at a cheaper price, consumers are buying the other product. The 
public sector is still, however, insulated from this world competition. Each country's 
Government still functions independently of others and does not reap the benefits of this 
heightened competition. Private industry has achieved savings through competition and the 
Government is following its example. Privatization is seen as a way to achieve this goal. 
(Gore, 1993, pp. 43-44) 
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lll. IMPEDIMENTS TO PRIVATIZING DOD UTILITY SYSTEMS 
Although privatization offers numerous benefits, it is not appropriate in all 
circumstances (GAO/GGD-92-11, 1991). "The Government should not contract out its 
responsibilities to serve the public interest or to exercise its sovereign powers (GAO/GGD-
92-11, 1991)." "Inherent Government functions should never be privatized but always 
performed by federal Government personnel (Whitta, 1996)." The inherent Governmental 
functions include national defense, criminal investigations, tax collection, and regulation of 
industry (Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 225). 
The privatization decision is situation-specific, requiring skill to anticipate 
stakeholders's reactions and choose a method of privatization which will make the plan 
acceptable to all parties (Pririe, 1985, p. 28). Numerous methods exist to achieve 
privatization, ranging from its purest form, selling off an entire Government enterprise into 
unregulated private ownership, to outsourcing or contracting-out to private industry for the 
provision of a service (Stroup, 1994, p. 558). Each situation must be individually appraised 
to determine the appropriate method of privatization, if any. The economic analysis must 
show privatization as a cost effective route for it to be the appropriate solution. (McCulla, 
November 22, 1996) 
The basic framework for the U. S. Government performance is set forth in the 
Constitution. Government was designed to be for the people, not necessarily for efficiency 
or effectiveness. (Stiglitz, 1988, p. 59) It has socioeconomic, political and other objectives 
(Stiglitz, 1988, p. 80). Public goods, such as national defense, are an example of inherently 
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Governmental functions which should not be privatized (Stiglitz, 1988, p. 120). There are 
" ... critical skills which must be maintained and strengthened within the DoD's workforce 
(Whitta, 1996)." 
The Air Force's overall long-term goal is to get out of the business of owning, 
operating and maintaining base utilities where it makes good sense, both 
economically and in accordance with mission constraints. The Air Force will 
retain utilities where needed to maintain readiness capabilities, but where it 
makes sense the utilities can be transferred to the private sector. In return, the 
Air Force will purchase a utility service at a negotiated rate, receive a reliable 
and cost efficient service, and generate savings for modernization of core 
disciplines. (Yinger, 1996) 
The Air Force may privatize its utility plants, but needs to retain ownership of some potable 
water, wastewater, gas, and electrical distribution systems to ensure it has the critical wartime 
skills needed to maintain such systems (Yinger, November 22, 1996). Air Force personnel 
need skills such as how to repair a broken water main line; when they go into combat they 
deploy to a military base near the area of conflict, and it is their responsibility to ensure 
utility service is provided for the base (Yinger, November 22, 1996). Below is a discussion 
of the two main categories of impediments to privatization of DoD utility systems. 
A. IMPLE:MENTATION CONCERNS 
Privatization" ... is not simply a question of 'selling off the state.' ... It is a question 
of regarding each part of the state as an individual problem requiring appropriate treatment 
(Pririe, 1985, p. 27)." 
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1. No Single Model 
Privatization is situation specific; there is no single model or formula (Pririe, 1985, 
p. 27). Recognition of the roles played by stakeholders, including interest groups, media, and 
political pressure groups, is vital to achieving a successful privatization (Pririe, 1985, p. 27). 
Provisions must be included to neutralize or outweigh the adverse effects of such 
stakeholders. Ideas must be presented in the correct manner (Goodman, 1985, p. 33). 
Government managers must be understanding of the problems of those displaced and design 
elements in the new policy to take care of them and recognize their interests. (Goodman, 
1985, p. 34) 
Judgement and skill are required to anticipate the various responses of stakeholders 
and apply appropriate measures to make the plan acceptable to all parties. The methods to 
be used vary. (Pririe, 1985, p. 29) "The process of privatization is not one which depends 
only on the will of a Government. There must also be considerable creativity in policy 
innovation (Pririe, 1985, pp. 28-29)." Although there is no single model to follow to achieve 
successful privatization, Britain employed six main techniques which were successful in 
privatizing numerous state assets (Goodman, 1985, pp. 25-34). 
a. Britain's Methods 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's Government began its privatization 
movement by first making changes on a small scale, gradually presented one after another, 
so that no one was particularly zealous about them (Goodman, 1985, p. 26). Second, think 
tanks were utilized to circulate similar ideas prior to their being announced by the 
Government (Goodman, 1985, p. 29). This procedure gave the public time to become 
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accustomed to a concept. The fact that experts Who comprise the think tanks, not the 
Government, developed the new idea built the public's confidence and hence reduced the 
political risk associated with privatizing. The third technique was to effectively use the 
media to present the Government's perspective in a way which generated public support 
(Goodman, 1985, p. 30). Fourth, people were given their first taste of the market economy 
and its freedom of choice (Goodman, 1985, pp. 27-28). They discovered they had more 
flexibility and liked that. The last two techniques employed were to package ideas in a 
different and acceptable way and to build coalitions in support of these ideas. These six 
techniques are responsible for the tremendous success the Thatcher Government experienced 
with privatization of state operations including British Rail hotels; Sealink, the English 
Channel ferry services; the National Coal Board; British Sugar; The University of 
Buckingham; and British Leyland's Jaguar division. (Goodman, 198, pp. 26-76) 
b. DoD's Utility System Models 
There are fundamental differences between privatization in the United States 
and Britain. For the purposes of this thesis, only brief mention will be given to them. Britain 
was concerned primarily with selling off assets, while privatization in America is primarily 
concerned with dismantling Government services (Goodman, 1985, p. 41). The Constitution 
structured the American system for potential gridlock. It created the three equal branches of 
Government and the system in which the President's political party does not necessarily have 
a majority in Congress and Congress has authority to override a Presidential veto by a 
two/thirds vote. With this background, privatization of DoD's utility systems will now be 
studied. 
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The Department of the Army's (DoA) policy on privatization " ... encourages 
the ownership and full services of local municipal, private, regional or cooperative utility 
companies when such use is cost effective (Army Technical Note No. 420-41-3, p. A-2.)" 
The Military Services each have their own, different goals in regards to the privatization of 
utilities systems. The Army's goal is to privatize at least 7 5 percent of its utility systems by 
the year 2000 (Eng, 1996, p. 4). The Air Force, as stated above, wants to " ... get out of the 
business of owning, operating and maintaining base utilities where it makes good sense, both 
economically and in accordance with mission constraints (Vinger, 1996)." To date, the Navy 
does not have an official policy stating its utility privatization goals (Ashley, November 22, 
1996). 
The Navy is currently performing privatization studies at four pilot sites, NAS 
Whidbey Island, Washington; Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, California; 
Naval Station Pascagoula, Mississippi; and NAS Jacksonville, Florida to develop its policy 
on the privatization of utility systems (Ashley, November 22, 1996). The Office of 
Management and Budget Circular A-76 does not apply to these studies. The Jacksonville 
area, specifically, completed an A-76 study in the late 1980s when the area outsourced its 
Public Works functions (Ashley, December 12, 1996). In March, 1997 the points of contact 
at each of these pilot sites will meet with Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NA VF AC) 
personnel to identify the lessons learned from these sites. Based upon these lessons, the 
Navy will draft recommendations to the Director of Shore Installation Management Division, 
Chief of Naval Operations, to set the policy. (Ashley, November 22, 1996) 
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The Air Force has also chosen four pilot sites to study the feasibility of 
privatizing utility systems (Yinger, November 22, 1996). These sites are Langley Air Force 
Base, Virginia; Scott Air Force Base, lllinois; Hill Air Force Base, Utah; and Edwards Air 
Force Base, California. If these studies indicate that it is beneficial for the Air Force to 
privatize some systems, the Air Force may relocate its engineering personnel to a few 
specific bases, where it will retain ownership of the utilities systems, so that airmen may 
receive the required training. This concentration of training will enable the other base utility 
systems to be privatized, while still providing the capability to train members to perform the 
required critical skills associated with operation of the systems. (Yinger, November 22, 
1996) 
2. Interested Party 
An important element required for successful privatization is a party interested in 
taking ownership of the system (Thumma, November 22, 1996). Unless there is an interested 
party, DoD cannot sell its system. In the case of NA VWEPSTA Earle, New Jersey 
American Water Company (NJA WC) was interested in obtaining ownership of the potable 
water distribution system in the summer of 1995 (Thumma, November 22, 1996). However, 
it lost interest prior to the time when the Navy would have been able to receive 
Congressional approval for the privatization. (Thumma, November 22, 1996) This case 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. 
3. Legal Liability 
Legal liability covers who will be the responsible party for cleanup of an 
environmental hazard which is discovered after privatization occurs (McCulla, November 
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22, 1996). The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) ensures that the Government will be responsible for the cleanup of any 
contaminated property prior to transferring it to a new owner or if in the future the new 
owner can prove that the property was contaminated while under the Government's control 
(McCulla, November 27, 1996). Regardless of this act, all implementation plans must 
address the crucial item of legal liability (Brasse, 1996, p. 14). Therefore, a preliminary 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) must be performed for all utilities which DoD is 
considering privatizing (McCulla, November 22, 1996). The EIS lists the historical land 
usage, for example, whether there was ever an oil depot or an ammunition stockpile on that 
location. The EIS is intended to protect both the contractor and DoD from being falsely 
accused of contaminating a site. The EIS documents the condition of the land and identifies 
any toxic areas which require clean up before the Government transfers the utility system to 
private industry. (McCulla, November 22, 1996) The degree of legal liability is one of the 
greatest fears a private firm has in taking ownership of an existing Government utility 
system. (Brasse, 1996, p. 14) The EIS gives the contractor confidence about the condition 
of the site before ownership is transferred. 
4. Lack of Control/Enforcement Mechanisms 
When a service is privatized, in general, it no longer comes under the control of the 
Government (Ashley, November 22, 1996). Government is just another client, without the 
special privileges of ownership (Thumma, November 22, 1996). The transfer must be 
structured so that both the Government and the new private owner benefit. Measures must 
be included which state the minimal level of service required (Thumma, November 22, 
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1996). As a final precaution, the Army requires its privatization agreements to include a 
reversion clause for failure to serve. (Brasse, 1996, p. 15) However, the burden is on the 
Government to prove a quality or noncompliance issue (McCulla, November 22, 1996). 
B. CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION 
Currently, DoD is working with Congress on three specific legislative matters which 
are impediments to privatization of utility systems: the Contribution-in-Aid-of-Construction 
(CIAC) Tax, the request for authority to approve privatization at the level of the Secretaries 
of the Services, (Bryan, 1996) and a Fair Market Value ruling. (McCulla, November 4, 
1996) The following discussion explains these three issues. 
1. CIAC Tax 
This tax requires that the new owners of utility systems pay taxes on the difference 
between the price paid for the system and the amount the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
deems to be the fair market value of the acquired system (McCulla, November 22, 1996). 
This amount is taxed at the 34 percent corporate tax rate (McCulla, November 27, 1996). 
Depending upon a private utility company's charter, the tax may have to be charged as a fee 
to the one customer who caused it. If this is the case, the Government would pay 
approximately 49 percent of the fair-market value amount on which the IRS taxed the 
company through the increase in the service's rate structure, substantially reducing the 
savings to be reaped through privatization. (McCulla, November 22, 1996) 
Public Law 104-188, H.R. 3448, Section 1613, passed on August 20, 1996, waived 
this tax for transfers for water or sewage disposal services. However, to date no such waiver 
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is authorized for gas and electric systems (McCulla, November 4, 1996). Proposed DoA 
legislation to correct this oversight is not expected to be signed until fiscal year 1999. 
(McCulla, November 4, 1996) 
2. Authorization Level 
The Navy and the Air Force have interpreted current legislation as requiring 
Congressional approval to privatize any utility system (Ashley, November 22, 1996; Yinger, 
November 22, 1996). The Air Force Utilities Privatization Process, found on page 28, 
illustrates the Air Force's tentative privatization flowchart. This flowchart assumes that the 
Secretary of the Air Force will be authorized to approve privatization initiatives. (Yinger, 
November 22, 1996) The Privatization Flowchart for Army & Navy, found on pages 29-32, 
depicts the steps currently required for these Services to achieve utilities privatization. It 
illustrates the attempt to have a unified process for privatization, but page 32 shows that there 
is no single model (Ashley, November 22, 1996). The Army's policy differs and specifies 
approval authority with the Secretary of the Army, but requires a 21-day Congressional 
notification period, for any privatization which does not involve the transfer of land, as 
shown on page 32. (McCulla, November 22, 1996) 
The process of securing Congressional authorization begins with drafting a proposal 
for the transfer of the utility system, with supporting economic analysis (McCulla, November 
4, 1996). This proposal is added to the Congressional docket, reviewed by members and if 
approved, transfer is authorized (McCulla, November4, 1996). However, market conditions 
can change between initial analysis and the time of voting (Thumma, November 22, 1996). 
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Also, the private firm may lose interest in the acquisition, as will be discussed in Chapter N, 
the NA VWEPSTA Earle, New Jersey, case study. 
To remove these impediments, the Military Services have drafted legislative 
proposals to change the authority level required to approve a privatization proposal to the 
level of the Secretary of the Military Department (Ashley, November 22, 1996; McCulla, 
November 22, 1996; Vinger, November 22, 1996). If approved, the Military Services will 
still submit an economic analysis of the proposed privatization to the Congressional Military 
Construction Committee for approval (Vinger, November 22, 1996). If, at the end of 21 
days, the committee has not made any comments regarding the privatization, it is considered 
approved. This legislative proposal is expected to be reviewed by Congress in fiscal year 
1997 and would shorten the transfer process by approximately two years. (Vinger, November 
22, 1996) 
3. Fair Market Value 
Currently, Title 40 of the United States Code, Section 484, and Chapter 41 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 101, Part 47, Subpart 305-1, require that a minimum 
of fair market value be received for the transfer of property (McCulla, November 4, 1996; 
United States Code, 1995; Code of Federal Regulations, 1995). The DoA is drafting 
language for Congressional approval to specify that recoupment of the fair market value be 
in any form considered to be beneficial to the Government. This determination could include 
alternate methods such as applying a facility credit over the life cycle of the utility system. 
Currently, if a company purchases a utility system for a lump sum of money, the investment 
must be financed. In turn, any interest expense is passed on to the consumer who pays 
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through higher rates. The DoA believes that the passage of this legislation will be a win-win 
situation for everyone. Industry can reduce its initial investment to purchase a utility and the 
Military Services are not subject to higher rates resulting from the initial outlay required to 
obtain the system. (McCulla, November 4, 1996) 
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IV. PRIVATIZATION CASE STUDY 
Privatization has become popular in DoD because it is seen as a way to relieve the 
Military Services of their current burden of •• ... failing utilities, aging technology, huge 
maintenance and repair backlog, mandated downsizing, and mounting safety and 
environmental concerns (Eng, 1996, p. 4)." DoD has adopted a policy which fosters the 
privatization of noncore functions. Government-owned utility systems is one area in which 
DoD recommends privatization when an economic analysis shows it to be in the 
Government's best interest. This means that the privatization would save money without 
jeopardizing the reliability of service or the security of the mission (C. H. Guernsey & 
Company, August 1995, p. 1-2). The Navy hired engineering consultants, C. H. Guernsey 
& Company, to perform a privatization study of NA VWEPSTA Earle, New Jersey to 
determine the feasibility of privatizing it. To date, this is the only completed privatization 
study of a Navy potable water distribution system. 
Guernsey examined Earle's electrical distribution system and potable water 
distribution system " ... to address the costs and benefits associated with the potential 
privatization of the Station's utility systems (C. H. Guernsey & Company, 1995, p. 1-1)." 
This chapter presents the Guernsey study of Earle's potable water distribution system. The 
analysis will then be used in the next chapter as a framework for analyzing whether or not 
it is in the best interest of the Government to privatize the potable water distribution systems 
of the Jacksonville Military Complex. 
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Guernsey considered three alternatives in their study. Alternative 1 maintained the 
status quo, Government ownership, operation, and maintenance of the potable water 
distribution system. Alternative 2 considered selling the system to New Jersey American 
Water Company (NJAWC) for its bid price of $1.1 million. Alternative 3 contemplates 
selling the water system to NJA WC for $2 million, the value that Guernsey calculated to be 
its fair-market value. (C. H. Guernsey & Company, August 1995, p. 1-5) Guernsey uses a 
$2 million value for their calculations of alternative 3, although it refers to this value as $1.9 
million in the text of its study. For purposes of this thesis, alternative 3 will be referred to 
as the $2 million system value. In order to ascertain which alternative was in the best interest 
of the Government, Guernsey performed numerous financial calculations to determine the 
net present value (NPV) of the costs of each alternative. The alternative found to have the 
smallest NPV is the one which is in the best interest of the Government. This chapter will 
look at each of the three alternatives to see which one has the smallest NPV and to gain an 
understanding of the types of calculations required when considering privatization of a 
potable water distribution system. Chapter V will then apply these types of calculations to 
the Jacksonville Military Complex's water systems. 
A. NA VWEPSTA EARLE, NEW JERSEY 
The NA VWEPSTA Earle's mission is to receive, renovate, store and issue 
ammunition, explosives, expendable items and/or weapons and technical ordnance material 
and perform additional tasks as directed by the Commander of Naval Sea Systems 
Command. It is one of the Navy's three major ammunition depots which support the 
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Atlantic Fleet. Three Ammunition Auxiliary Ships (AE) and two Fuel and Ammunition 
Auxiliary Ships (AOE) are homeported at Earle. The base has two major land areas, 
Mainside (10,160 acres and 301 buildings with 1,693,000 gross square footage (gst) of 
building space) and Waterfront (705 acres, 53 buildings with 297,000 gsf of building space, 
and a 2-mile trestle serving four piers). These two areas are connected by a 15-mile long 
(253 acres) road and railroad line. (C. H. Guernsey & Company, August 1995, p. 2-1) 
The NA VWEPSTA Earle has two separate potable water distribution systems, the 
majority of which was constructed in the early 1940s. The Mainside's system comprises 
approximately 116,525 linear feet of water lines, and the Waterfront and Pier areas contain 
approximately 26,140 linear feet of water lines. The distribution system also includes five 
water storage tanks, one tank with a 300,000 gallon capacity and the other four tanks with 
250,000 gallon capacity each. The Station does not currently use any of these tanks. (C. H. 
Guernsey & Company, August 1995, p. 2-8) 
The NA VWEPSTA Earle's quality of water meets or exceeds the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and New Jersey state environmental standards. Its potable water 
distribution system is highly reliable. Both base personnel and contractors maintain and 
repair the system, resulting in minimal disruptions of service and down-time. (C. H. 
Guernsey & Company, August 1995, p. 2-9) 
B. ALTERNATIVE 1- STATUS QUO 
The Government continues to own, operate, and maintain the water system , but buys 
water from NJAWC. Table 1 summarizes this alternative's NPV calculations. 
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Table 1. Life-Cycle Cost Report: Alternative 1-Status Quo 
Year Water O&M Unit Cost Admin& Total MOY Present Cumulative 
Purchases Expenses of Overhead Annual Factors Value Net Present 
(01) (02) Capital (04) Outlays (06) (07) Value (08) 
(03) (05) 
1996 $ 592,709 $ 101,143 $ 112,920 $ 20,850 $ 827,622 0.968 $ 800,841 $ 800,841 
1997 $ 612,105 $ 103,419 $ 115,179 $ 21,319 $ 852,022 0.906 $ 771,959 $ 1,572,800 
1998 $ 631,827 $ 105,694 $ 117,482 $ 21,788 $ 876,791 0.848 $ 743,821 $ 2,316,621 
1999 $ 652,185 $ 108,020 $ 119,832 $ 22,267 $ 902,304 0.794 $ 716,726 $ 3,033,347 
2000 $ 673,198 $ 110,396 $ 122,229 $ 22,757 $ 928,580 0.744 $690,636 $ 3,723,983 
2001_ $ 694,888 $ 112,825 $ 124,673 $ 23,258 $ 955,644 0.696 $ 665,509 $ 4,389,492 
2002 $ 717,277 $ 115,307 $ 127,167 $ 23,769 $ 983,520 0.652 $ 641,313 $ 5,030,805 
2003 $ 740,389 $ 117,844 $ 129,710 $ 24,292 $ 1,012,235 0.611 $ 618,011 $ 5,648,816 
2004 $ 764,244 $ 120,436 $ 132,304 $ 24,827 $ 1,041,811 0.572 $ 595,571 $ 6,244,387 
2005 $ 788,867 $ 123,086 $ 134,950 $ 25,373 $ 1,072,276 0.535 $573,957 $ 6,818,344 
2006 $ 814,284 $ 125,794 $ 137,649 $ 25,931 $ 1,103,658 0.501 $ 553,142 $ 7,371,486 
2007 $ 840,522 $ 128,561 $ 140,402 $ 26,502 $ 1,135,987 0.469 $533,095 $ 7,904,581 
2008 $ 867,602 $ 131,390 $ 143,210 $ 27,085 $ 1,169,287 0.439 $ 513,783 $ 8,418,364 
2009 $ 895,557 $ 134,280 $ 146,074 $ 27,681 $ 1,203,592 0.411 $495,184 $ 8,913,548 
2010 $ 924,412 $ 137,234 $ 148,996 $ 28,289 $ 1,238,931 0.385 $477,269 $ 9,390,817 
2011 $ 954,196 $ 140,253 $ 151,976 $ 28,912 $ 1,275,337 0.361 $460,013 $ 9,850,830 
2012 $ 984,940 $ 143,339 $ 155,015 $ 29,548 $ 1,312,842 0.338 $443,390 $ 10,294,220 
2013 $ 1,016,676 $ 146,493 $ 158,116 $ 30,198 $ 1,351,483 0.316 $427,379 $ 10,721,599 
2014 $ 1,049,433 $ 149,715 $ 161,278 $ 30,862 $ 1,391,288 0.296 $411,954 $ 11,133,553 
2015 $ 1,083,245 $ 153,009 $ 164,504 $ 31,541 $ 1,432,299 0.277 $397,096 $ 11,530,649 
2016 $ 1,118,147 $ 156,375 $ 167,794 $ 32,235 $ 1,474,551 0.260 $ 382,781 $ 11,913,430 
2017 $ 1,154,175 $ 159,816 $ 171,150 $ 32,944 $ 1,518,085 0.243 $368,990 $ 12,282,420 
2018 $ 1,191,361 $ 163,331 $ 174,573 $ 33,669 $ 1,562,934 0.228 $355,703 $ 12,638,123 
2019 $ 1,229,748 $ 166,925 $ 178,064 $ 34,410 $ 1,609,147 0.213 $342,904 $ 12,981,027 
2020 $ 1,269,370 $ 170,597 $ 181,625 $ 35,167 $ 1,656,759 0.200 $330,570 $ 13,311,596 
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1. Annual Water Consumption 
Column (01) of Table 1 involves water purchases from NJAWC. To determine this 
figure, the Station's annual water consumption must first be calculated. Consumption on 
NA VWEPSTA Earle is monitored at sixteen different meters, four of which account for 
approximately 98.5% of usage (C. H. Guernsey & Company, 1995, p. 3-7). Table 2lists the 
FY 1994 Station consumption, which totaled 156,200 kgal, by location. 
Table 2. Summary of NA VWEPSTA Earle's FY1994 Water Consumption per Meter 
Meter Number Location Meter Size Usage(kgal) Percent 
1 Mains ide 4" 81,220 52.00 
2 Mains ide 2" 3 0.00 
3 Mainside 3 114" 0 0.00 
4 Waterfront Piers 2" 40,517 25.93 
5 Waterfront Piers 2" 22,127 14.16 
6 Waterfront Admin 2112" 0 0.00 
7 Waterfront Admin 5/8" 0 0.00 
8 Waterfront Admin 6" 10,130 6.48 
9 Waterfront Admin 6" 1,330 0.85 
10 Waterfront Admin 4" 11 0.01 
11 Waterfront Admin 2" 677 0.43 
12 Waterfront Admin 4" 218 0.14 
13 Waterfront Admin 1 5/8" 0 0.00 
14 Waterfront Admin 2 5/8" 0 0.00 
15 Waterfront Admin 2 5/8" 0 0.00 
16 Waterfront Admin 2 5/8" 0 0.00 
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Future water consumption at NA VWEPSTA Earle is dependent upon the waterfront 
activities, i.e. how many ships are in port and their length of stay. C. H. Guernsey assumed 
that the Station's requirements for potable water would increase at 1.0 percent per year until 
the year 2005 and at 0.5 percent thereafter through the year 2020, when its 25-year life-cycle 
cost analysis concludes. (C. H. Guernsey & Company, August 1995, p. 3-8) 
The water purchased by NA VWEPST A Earle is charged at Rate Schedule B, Table 
3 (C. H. Guernsey & Company, August 1995, p. 3-8). 
Table 3. NJA WC Rate Schedule B • General Service Rate Components 
Meter Size Fee per month Fee per quarter 
5/8" $ 5.73 $ 13.69 
3/4" $ 8.60 $ 25.80 
1" $ 14.33 $ 42.99 
11/2" $ 28.65 $ 85.95 
2" $ 45.84 $ 137.50 
3" $ 85.95 $ 257.85 
4" $ 143.25 $ 429.75 
6" $ 286.50 $ 859.50 
8" $ 458.40 $ 1,375.20 
To compute the monthly cost of water purchased, the meter size of each location must 
be known. Table 2 mentions the size of each meter found at the 16locations where Earle 
records consumption. The monthly consumption is multiplied by the charge per kgal of 
water, which is then added to the monthly fee, found in Table 3, for that meter size. It is 
interesting to note that Rate Schedule B is NJAWC's retail rates, which factor in the cost of 
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repairs to a system and a share of the fee required to repay an investment.. Although NJAWC 
did not maintain the Earle system, the Station was being charged as if it did. (Kilway, 
November 25, 1996) Atlantic Division of NA VFAC (LANTDIV), which contracts the 
water service on Earle, has not tried to negotiate this rate down to a level whi~h excludes 
charges for repairs to the system, as it is pursuing privatization of the system. NJA WC has 
stated that, if it takes ownership of the system, it will continue to serve the Station under Rate 
Schedule B, without any additional billing. If privatization does not occur, LANTDIV 
intends to negotiate a rate schedule which does not include these additional charges 
(Thumma, November 22, 1996). 
2. Operations & Maintenance Expenses 
This expense includes all costs associated with the daily operations of the water 
system, as well as any repairs and maintenance which have to be performed to the system. 
The Station's O&M expenses for FY1994 were $117,000, and C. H. Guernsey projected 
them to be $100,000 for FY1995, based upon a three-man potable water 
distribution/wastewater collection crew. (C. H. Guernsey & Company, August 1995, p. 2-9) 
Column (02) of Table 1 projects these costs to increase at the rate of inflation over the 
study's 25-year period. 
3. Unit Cost of Capital 
The unit cost of capital term included in this analysis is the Government's imputed 
cost of money and may be found in Table 4 and in column (03) of Table 1. Typically, the 
Government finances its investments with debt, which has an interest rate of 6-7 percent 
(Kilway, November 25, 1996). The unit cost of capital used in this study is 10 percent to 
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reflect the depreciation and other carrying charges typically associated with a private sector 
investment. Guernsey was directed by the Army and Navy to use 10 percent for this figure, 
to achieve a common framework to compare the total cost to serve with the privatization 
alternatives. (Robie, December 3, 1996). 
To calculate the unit cost of capital, first the fair-market value for the potable water 
distribution system must be determined. Guernsey's calculations for the fair-market value 
utilized replacement cost less accumulated depreciation. This net amount was computed by 
multiplying the replacement cost 
... by the ratio of the remaining useful life to the useful life of a new facility. 
Regardless of age of the specific component, the minimum ratio utilized was 
20 percent. All piping, buildings and concrete structures were assumed to 
have a useful life of 50 years. (C. H. Guernsey & Company, August 1995, 
p. 2-10) 
This fair-market value is multiplied by 10 percent to obtain a starting place for the unit cost 
of capital calculation as shown in column (01) of Table 4. The Earle study assumed that the 
Station would invest 2 percent of its existing plant value per year in new system 
replacements and improvements as shown in column (02) of Table 4. (C. H. Guernsey, 
August 1995, p. 4-7) This 2 percent figure came from historical data which indicated DoD 
spends approximately 2.2 percent per year on these types of improvements (Kilway, 
November 25, 1996). This study did not provide a credit for depreciation, which Guernsey 
now believes is appropriate. Columns (01) and (02) of Table 4 are added together to 
determine the ending value, column (03), which is then multiplied by 10 percent to arrive at 
that year's unit cost of capital, column (05). 
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Table 4. Unit Cost of Capital Calculation 
Year Beginning Additions Ending %Rate Unit Cost of 
(01) (02) (03) (04) Capital (05) 
1995 $ 1,107,062 $ 0 $ 1,107,062 10.00% 
1996 $ 1,107,062 $ 22,141 $ 1,129,203 10.00% $ 112,920 
1997 $ 1,129,203 $ 22,584 $ 1,151,787 10.00% $ 115,179 
1998 $ 1,151,787 $ 23,036 $ 1,174,823 10.00% $ 117,482 
1999 $ 1,174,823 $ 23,496 $ 1,198,320 10.00% $ 119,832 
2000 $ 1,198,320 $ 23,966 $ 1,222,286 10.00% $ 122,229 
2001 $ 1,222,286 $ 24,446 $ 1,246,732 10.00% $ 124,673 
2002 $ 1,246,732 $ 24,935 $ 1,271,666 10.00% $ 127,167 
2003 $ 1,271,666 $ 25,433 $ 1,297,100 10.00% $ 129,710 
2004 $ 1,297,100 $ 25,942 $ 1,323,042 10.00% $ 132,304 
2005 $ 1,323,042 $ 26,461 $ 1,349,502 10.00% $ 134,905 
2006 $ 1,349,502 $ 26,990 $ 1,376,492 10.00% $ 137,649 
2007 $ 1,376,492 $ 27,530 $ 1,404,022 10.00% $ 140,402 
2008 $ 1,404,022 $ 28,080 $ 1,432,103 10.00% $ 143,210 
2009 $ ' 1,432,103 $ 29,462 $ 1,460,745 10.00% $ 146,074 
2010 $ 1,460,745 $ 29,215 $ 1,489,960 10.00% $ 148,996 
2011 $ 1,489,960 $ 29,799 $ 1,519,759 10.00% $ 151,976 
2012 $ 1,519,759 $ 30,395 $ 1,550,154 10.00% $ 155,015 
2013 $ 1,550,154 $ 31,003 $ 1,581,157 10.00% $ 158,116 
2014 $ 1,581,157 $ 31,623 $ 1,612,780 10.00% $ 161,278 
2015 $ 1,612,780 $ 32,256 $ 1,645,036 10.00% $ 164,504 
2016 $ 1,645,036 $ 32,901 $ 1,677,937 10.00% $ 167,794 
2017 $ 1,677,937 $ 33,559 $ 1,711,495 10.00% $ 171,150 
2018 $ 1,711,495 $ 34,230 $ 1,745,725 10.00% $ 174,573 
2019 $ 1,745,725 $ 34,915 $ 1,780,640 10.00% $ 178,064 
2020 $ 1,780,640 $ 35,613 $ 1,816,253 10.00% $ 181,625 
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4. Administrative and Overhead Expenses 
Guernsey estimated this cost to be 3 percent of the sum of NA VWEPSTA Earle's 
annual water purchases and O&M expenses. In FYI995, this expense was computed to be 
$20,6I4 (C. H. Guernsey & Company, August I995, p. 4-7) Guernsey's calculations for this 
figure, projected to increase at the rate of inflation over the study's 25-year period, are 
located in column (04) of Table I. 
5. Net Present Value Calculation for Alternative 1 
The purpose of Table I is to calculate the Net Present Value for alternative I. In 
order to determine this figure, numerous calculations must be made. Column (05) of Table 
1, total annual outlays, is a sum of columns (01)- (04). This value is then multiplied by the 
middle of the year (MOY) discount factor at 6.8 percent in column (06) to arrive at the 
present value of the annual outlays, column (07). Guernsey was directed to use a 6.8 percent 
discount rate by the Navy (Robie, December 3, I996). Finally, the cumulative NPV is 
calculated in column (08) by summing all of the year's present values. The result of the 
calculations for alternative I is a NPV of $13,311,597. 
C. ALTERNATIVE 2 - NJA WC's $1.1 MILLION BID PRICE 
Table 5 provides a detailed list of the calculations performed for this alternative. 
Column (01) of Table 5, water purchases, is the same for this alternative as it is for 
alternative 1. Column (02) of Table 5, facilities credit, is a new calculation. 
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Table 5. Life-Cycle Cost Report: Alternative 2-NJA WC's $1.1 Million Bid Price 
Year Water Facilities Total MOY Present Cumulative 
Purchases Credit Annual Factors Value Net 
(01) (02) Outlays (03) (04) (OS) Present 
Value (06) 
1996 $ 592,709 i:180,168) $ 412,541 0.968 $ 399,191 $ 399,191 
1997 $ 612,105 i:180,168) $ 431,937 0.906 $ 391,348 $ 790,539 
1998 $ 631,827 i:180,168) $ 451,659 0.848 $ 383,163 $ 1,173,702 
1999 $ 652,185 S:180,168) $ 472,017 0.794 $ 374,937 $ 1,548,639 
2000 $ 673,198 i:180,168) $ 493,030 0.744 $ 366,694 $ 1,915,333 
2001 $ 694,888 S:180,168) $ 514,720 0.696 $ 358,450 $ 2,273,783 
2002 $ 717,277 i:180,168) $ 537,109 0.652 $ 350,227 $ 2,624,010 
2003 $ 740,389 i:180,168) $ 560,221 0.611 $ 342,038 $ 2,966,048 
2004 $ 764,244 i:180,168) $ 584,076 0.572 $ 333,898 $ 3,299,946 
2005 $ 788,867 i:180,168) $ 608,699 0.535 $ 325,819 $ 3,625,765 
2006 $ 814,284 $ 0 $ 814,284 0.501 $ 408,111 $ 4,033,876 
2007 $ 840,522 $ 0 $ 840,522 0.469 $ 394,439 $ 4,428,315 
2008 $ 867,602 $ 0 $ 867,602 0.439 $ 381,224 $ 4,809,539 
2009 $ 895,557 $ 0 $ 895,557 0.411 $ 368,452 $ 5,177,991 
2010 $ 924,412 $ 0 $ 924,412 0.385 $ 356,108 $ 5,534,099 
2011 $ 954,196 $ 0 $ 954,196 0.361 $ 344,178 $ 5,878,277 
2012 $ 984,940 $ 0 $ 984,940 0.338 $ 332,647 $ 6,210,924 
2013 $ 1,016,676 $ 0 $ 1,016,676 0.316 $ 321,503 $ 6,532,427 
2014 $ 1,049,433 $ 0 $ 1,049,433 0.296 $ 310,732 $ 6,843,159 
2015 $ 1,083,245 $ 0 $ 1,083,245 0.277 $ 300,322 $ 7,143,481 
2016 $ 1,118,147 $ 0 $ 1,118,147 0.260 $ 290,261 $ 7,433,742 
2017 $ 1,154,175 $ 0 $ 1,154,175 0.243 $ 280,537 $ 7,714,279 
2018 $ 1,191,361 $ 0 $ 1,191,361 0.228 $ 271,138 $ 7,985,417 
2019 $ 1,229,748 $ 0 $ 1,229,748 0.213 $ 262,055 $ 8,247,472 
2020 $ 1,269,370 $ 0 $ 1,269,370 0.200 $ 253,275 $ 8,500,747 
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1. Facilities Credit 
NJ A WC would not pay the Government $1.1 million in cash upon transfer of the 
facilities to it from the Government. Rather, the facilities credit is used to repay the 
Government the estimated fair-market value of the Station's system over a 10-year period 
to lessen the fmancial burden resulting from the purchase and thereby offset a potential rate 
increase which this investment would cause. The facilities credit amounts to a constant 
annual payment to the Government by the company to whom the utilities system was sold 
iii the privatization. It is calculated for a 10-year payback due to Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Part 41, Subpart 103, which limits the Government's maximum contract length 
to 10 years. Each payment includes principal and interest at 10 percent. (C. H. Guernsey & 
Company, August 1995, p. 4-7) It is similar to a mortgage payment in that payments are 
constant, including more interest in the earlier years and a larger percentage of principal in 
the later years. Table 6 illustrates this calculation. 
2. Net Present Value Calculation for Alternative 2 
The purpose of Table 5 is to calculate the Net Present Value for alternative 2. Just 
as for alternative 1, this entails performing numerous calculations. Column (03) of Table 5, 
total annual outlays, is a sum of columns (01) and (02). This value is then multiplied by the 
middle of the year (MOY) discount factor at 6.8 percent, found in column (04) to arrive at 
the present value of the annual outlays, column (05). Finally, the cumulative NPV is 
calculated in column (06) by summing all of the year's present values. The result of the 
calculations for alternative 2 is a NPV of $8,500,747. 
46 
Table 6. Facilities Credit Calculation-Alternative 2 
Year Beginning Interest Facilities Credit Ending %Rate 
Baseline $ 1,107,062 $ 0 $ 0 $ 1,107,062 10.00% 
1996 $ 1,107,062 $110,706 $ (180,169) $ 1,037,599 10.00% 
1997 $ 1,037,599 $103,760 $ (180,169) $ 961,190 10.00% 
1998 $ 961,190 $ 96,119 $ (180,169) $ 877,139 10.00% 
1999 $ 877,139 $ 87,714 $ (180,169) $ 784,684 10.00% 
2000 $ 784,684 $ 78,468 $ (180,169) $ 682,983 10.00% 
2001 $ 682,983 $ 68,298 $ (180,169) $ 571,112 10.00% 
2002 $ 571,112 $ 57,111 $ (180,169) $ 448,054 10.00% 
2003 $ 448,054 $ 44,805 $ (180,169) $ 312,690 10.00% 
2004 $ 312,690 $ 31,269 $ (180,169) $ 163,790 10.00% 
2005 $ 163,790 $ 16,379 $ (180,169) $ 0 10.00% 
D. ALTERNATIVE 3 ·GUERNSEY'S $2 MILLION PRICE 
The difference between alternatives 2 and 3 is found in the facilities credit amounts 
generated by the different sales prices. Table 7 contains this alternative's facility credit 
calculations. 
Table 8 is the life-cycle cost report for Alternative 3. Its pwpose is to calculate the 
Net Present Value for alternative 3. Just as for alternative 2, Column (03) of Table 8, total 
annual outlays, is a sum of columns (01) and (02). This value is then multiplied by the 
middle of the year (MOY) discount factor at 6.8 percent, found in column (04) to arrive at 
the present value of the total annual outlays, column (05). Finally, the cumulative NPV is 
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calculated in column (06) by summing all of the year's present values. -The result of the 
calculations for alternative 3 is a NPV of $7,375,814. 
Table 7. Facilities Credit Calculation-Alternative 3 
Year Beginning Interest Facilities Credit Ending %Rate 
Baseline $ 2,050,580 $ 0 $ 0 $ 2,050,580 10.00% 
1996 $ 2,050,580 $205,058 $ (333,722) $ 1,921,916 10.00% 
1997 $ 1,921,916 $192,192 $ (333,722) $ 1,780,385 10.00% 
1998 $ 1,780,385 $178,038 $ (333,722) $ 1,624,701 10.00% 
1999 $ 1,624,701 $162,470 $ (333,722) $ 1,453,448 10.00% 
2000 $ 1,453,448 $145,345 $ (333,722) $ 1,265,071 10.00% 
2001 $ 1,265,071 $126,507 $ (333,722) $ 1,057,855 10.00% 
2002 $ 1,057,855 $105,786 $ (333,722) $ 829,918 10.00% 
2003 $ 829,918 $ 82,992 $ (333,722) $ 579,188 10.00% 
2004 $ 579,188 $ 57,919 $ (333,722) $ 303,384 10.00% 
2005 $ 303,384 $ 30,338 $ (333,722) $ 0 10.00% 
E. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF STUDY 
C. H. Guernsey offered conclusions and recommendations based upon the results 
of their life-cycle cost analysis calculations for the three alternatives studied. Table 9 is a 
summary of this analysis. (C. H. Guernsey & Company, August 1995, p. 4-8) 
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Table 8. Life-Cycle Cost Report: Alternative 3-Guernsey's $2-Million Price 
Year Water Facilities Total MOY Present Cumulative 
Purchases Credit Annual Factors Value Net 
(01) (02) Outlays (04) (OS) Present 
(03) Value (06) 
1996 $ 592,709 $(333,721) $ 258,988 0.968 $ 250,607 $ 250,607 
1997 $ 612,105 $ (333,721) $ 278,384 0.906 $ 252,224 $ 502,831 
1998 $ 631,827 $ (333,721) $ 298,106 0.848 $ 252,897 $ 755,728 
1999 $ 652,185 $ (333,721) $ 318,464 0.794 $ 252,966 $ 1,008,694 
2000 $ 673,198 $ (333,721) $ 339,477 0.744 $ 252,488 $ 1,261,182 
2001 $ 694,888 $ (333,721) $ 361,167 0.696 $ 251,516 $ 1,512,698 
2002 $ 717,277 $ (333,721) $ 383,556 0.652 $ 250,102 $ 1,762,800 
2003 $ 740,389 $ (333,721) $ 406,668 0.611 $ 248,288 $ 2,011,088 
2004 $ 764,244 $ (333,721) $ 430,523 0.572 $ 246,117 $ 2,257,205 
2005 $ 788,867 $ (333,721) $ 455,146 0.535 $ 243,627 $ 2,500,832 
2006 $ 814,284 $ 0 $ 814,284 0.501 $ 408,111 $ 2,908,943 
2007 $ 840,522 $ 0 $ 840,522 0.469 $ 394,439 $ 3,303,382 
2008 $ 867,602 $ 0 $ 867,602 0.439 $ 381,224 $ 3,684,606 
2009 $ 895,557 $ 0 $ 895,557 0.411 $ 368,452 $ 4,053,058 
2010 $ 924,412 $ 0 $ 924,412 0.385 $ 356,108 $ 4,409,166 
2011 $ 954,196 $ 0 $ 954,196 0.361 $ 344,178 $ 4,753,344 
2012 $ 984,940 $ 0 $ 984,940 0.338 $ 332,647 $ 5,085,991 
2013 $ 1,016,676 $ 0 $1,016,676 0.316 $ 321,503 $ 5,407,494 
2014 $ 1,049,433 $ 0 $1,049,433 0.296 $ 310,732 $ 5,718,226 
2015 $ 1,083,245 $ 0 $1,083,245 0.277 $ 300,322 $ 6,018,548 
2016 $ 1,118,147 $ 0 $1,118,147 0.260 $ 290,261 $ 6,308,809 
2017 $ 1,154,175 $ 0 $1,154,175 0.243 $ 280,537 $ 6,589,346 
2018 $ 1,191,361 $ 0 $1,191,361 0.228 $ 271,138 $ 6,860,484 
2019 $ 1,229,748 $ 0 $1,229,748 0.213 $ 262,055 $ 7,122,539 
2020 $ 1,269,370 $ 0 $1,269,370 0.200 $ 253,275 $ 737,581 
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Table 9. Summary of Potable Water Distribution System Life-Cycle Cost Analysis 
Alternatives Net Present Value 
1. Status Quo $ 13,312,000 
2. NJAWC's $1.1M Proposal $ 8,501,000 
3. Guernsey's $2M Sales Value $ 7,376,000 
Alternative 3, the $2 million sales price, was calculated to save the Government 
$5,936,000 compared to the status quo, over the 25-year study period. The NPV of the 
potable water distribution system was calculated to be 44.6 percent less for alternative 3 
than for the status quo, while alternative 2 was calculated to be 36.1 percent less than the 
status quo (C. H. Guernsey & Company, August 1995, p. 4-8). Thus, C. H. Guernsey 
recommended that NA VWEPSTA Earle privatize this system. 
C. H. Guernsey concluded that "privatization actions will provide a cost-effective 
means for continued safe and reliable potable water distribution service to the Station 
... NA VWEPSTA Earle should enter into negotiations with NJA WC to secure a facilities 
acquisition and service arrangement (C. H. Guernsey & Company, August 1995, p. 4-8)." 
F. WHATACTUALLYTRANSPIRED 
Since the study was performed, no further events have taken place. The NJA WC 
had been interested in acquiring the base's potable water distribution system. The 
NJAWC's service area included a small section on the southwestern side of the Station 
where there had been no prior need for piping. A new cogeneration plant was proposed 
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for construction in this location, and NJA WC wanted to service it. Thus, NJA WC was 
interested in acquiring the Station's potable water distribution system in order to make a 
splice into it and have to run only a few thousand feet of pipe to service the new 
cogeneration site. However, NJA WC could not wait the amount of time forecasted to 
obtain Congressional approval. The NJA WC purchased a small water company located 
on the southwestern side of the Station and planned to run approximately the same 
amount of pipe from this new system to the cogeneration plant as it would have had to 
nin from the Station. If Congressional approval had not been required, this facility would 
have been privatized in the late summer of 1995. (Thumma, November 22, 1996) 
Currently, over one year since this study was completed, LANTDN is discussing 
privatization of this system with NJA WC again. The cogeneration plant is still in the 
development stage, but NJAWC is now interested in obtaining the Station's system so 
that it will have redundancy in its lines in case either plant has technical difficulty. The 
numbers being used in this current scenario are quite different from those presented in 
this study. However, due to procurement sensitivity, they are not available for inclusion 
in this thesis. (Thumma, November 22, 1996) 
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V. PRIVATIZATION ANALYSIS OF THE JACKSONVILLE 1\llLITARY 
COMPLEX POTABLE WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
The Jacksonville Military Complex includes NAS Jacksonville, NAS Cecil Field, 
and NAVSTA Mayport. The logo ofNAS Jacksonville is "Service to the Fleet." It is a 
master air and industrial base and occupies 3,400 acres of land. The NAS Jacksonville is 
home to 66 P-3C Orion long-range anti-submarine reconnaissance and maritime patrol 
aircraft, 31 SH-60F Seahawk anti-submarine warfare helicopters and H-3 Sea King 
helicopters, four C-9 and two C-12 aircrafts. (Public Affairs Office for Commander, 
Naval Base Jacksonville, 1996) The NAS Cecil Field's mission is " ... to provide quality 
and responsive support to fleet units and tenants, outstanding facilities, a safe and healthy 
working and living environment, and a superb quality of life for Navy Marine Corps men 
and women and their dependents (Public Mfairs Office for Commander, Naval Base 
Jacksonville, 1996)." The Base is the south's only master jet base. It is home to 197 FA-
18 Hornet aircraft, 43 S-3B Viking aircraft, 8 ES-3A Shadow aircraft, and 1 C-12 aircraft. 
NAS Cecil Field is nearly 30,000 acres in size. It is scheduled for closure in September 
1998 as a result ofBRAC 1993. (Public Mfairs Office for Commander, Naval Base 
Jacksonville, 1996) 
The NAVSTA Mayport's motto is to provide ''The Finest Service to the Finest 
Fleet." It is home to 23 ships, including the aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy, 75 
SH-60 Seahawk anti-submarine warfare helicopters, and one C-12 aircraft. The base 
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encompasses more than 3,400 acres. (Public Mfairs Office for Commander, Naval Base 
Jacksonville, 1996) 
This chapter is an economic analysis to compare the costs of continuing 
Government ownership of these three bases' potable water distribution systems with the 
estimated costs if they were privatized. Currently, although the Navy owns these systems, 
their daily operation and maintenance is provided through a single, five-year Facilities, 
Maintenance, and Utilities (FMU) contract. Thus, they are considered a single entity, the 
Jacksonville Military Complex, in this cost comparison. 
This analysis considers two scenarios. Scenario 1 is the status quo; the 
Government owns the potable water distribution systems and contracts out their daily 
operation and maintenance. Scenario 2 considers privatizing the system, selling it to the 
local utilities- NAS Jacksonville and NAS Cecil Field to Jacksonville Electric Authority 
(JEA) and NA VST A Mayport to the City of Atlantic Beach. In order to ascertain which 
alternative is in the best interest of the Government, several financial calculations are 
performed to determine the NPV of each alternative. The alternative deemed to have the 
smallest NPV is the one which is in the best interest of the Government. Chapter VI will 
make recommendations, based upon the findings of this chapter. 
A. SCENARIO 1- STATUS QUO 
This scenario considers the Government continuing to own the Jacksonville 
Military Complex's potable water distribution systems and contract out their daily 
operation and maintenance. The three main calculations needed to tabulate the NPV of 
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scenario 1 are the annual operations & maintenance (O&M) expenses, the annual 
administrative & overhead expenses, and the annual unit cost of capital for the systems. 
Table 10 provides a summary of the NPV analysis for scenario 1. 
Table 10. Life-Cycle Cost Report: Scenario 1-Status Quo 
Fiscal O&M Admin & Unit Cost Total Annual Middle of Year Present Cumulative 
Year Expenses Overhead of Capital Outlays Discount Factors Value NPV 
(01) (02) (03) (04) (05) (06) (07) 
1996 $ 1,701,575 $ 166,153 $ 732,785 $ 2,600,513 0.968 $ 2,517,297 $ 2,517,297 
1997 $ 1,739,860 $ 169,891 $ 745,609 $2,655,360 0.906 $ 2,405,756 $ 4,923,053 
1998 $ 1,778,137 $ 173,629 $ 758,657 $2,710,423 0.848 $ 2,298,439 $ 7,221,491 
1999 $ 1,509,231 $ 147,371 $ 771,933 $2,428,535 0.794 $ 1,928,257 $ 9,149,748 
2000 $ 1,542,434 $ 150,613 $ 785,442 $2,478,489 0.744 $ 1,843,996 $10,993,744 
2001 $ 1,576,368 $ 153,927 $ 799,187 $2,529,482 0.696 $ 1,760,519 $12,754,264 
2002 $ 1,611,048 $ 157,313 $ 813,173 $2,581,534 0.652 $ 1,683,160 $14,437,424 
2003 $ 1,646,491 $ 160,774 $ 827,404 $2,634,669 0.611 $ 1,609,783 $16,047,206 
2004 $ 1,682,714 $ 164,311 $ 841,883 $2,688,908 0.572 $ 1,538,055 $17,585,262 
2005 $ 1,719,734 $ 167,926 $ 856,616 $2,744,276 0.535 $ 1,468,188 $19,053,449 
2006 $ 1,757,568 $ 171,620 $ 871,607 $2,800,795 0.501 $ 1,403,198 $20,456,648 
2007 $ 1,796,234 $ 175,396 $ 886,860 $2,858,490 0.469 $ 1,340,632 $21,797,280 
2008 $ 1,835,751 $ 179,255 $ 902,380 $2,917,386 0.439 $ 1,280,732 $23,078,012 
2009 $ 1,876,138 $ 183,198 $ 918,172 $2,977,508 0.411 $ 1,223,756 $24,301,768 
2010 $ 1,917,413 $187,229 $ 934,240 $3,038,882 0.385 $ 1,169,970 $25,471,737 
2011 $ 1,959,596 $ 191,348 $ 950,589 $3,101,533 0.361 $ 1,119,653 $26,591,391 
2012 $ 2,002,707 $195,558 $ 967,224 $3,165,489 0.338 $ 1,069,935 $27,661,326 
2013 $ 2,046,767 $ 199,860 $ 984,151 $3,230,778 0.316 $ 1,020,926 $28,682,252 
2014 $ 2,091,796 $204,257 $1,001,373 $3,297,426 0.296 $ 976,038 $29,658,290 
2015 $ 2,137,815 $208,750 $1,018,897 $3,365,462 0.277 $ 932,233 $30,590,523 
2016 $ 2,184,847 $213,343 $1,036,728 $3,434,918 0.260 $ 893,079 $31 ,483,602 
2017 $ 2,232,914 $218,036 $1,054,871 $3,505,821 0.243 $ 851,915 $32,335,516 
2018 $ 2,282,038 $222,833 $1,073,331 $3,578,202 0.228 $ 815,830 $33,151 ,346 
2019 $ 2,332,243 $227,736 $1,092,114 $3,652,093 0.213 $ 777,896 $33,929,242 
2020 $ 2,383,552 $232,746 $1,111,226 $3,727,524 0.200 $ 745,505 $34,674,747 
1. Operations & Maintenance Expense 
The O&M figure located in column (01) of Table 10 was obtained from Public 
Works Center (PWC) Jacksonville's Fiscal Year 1996, Utilities Cost Analysis Report 
(UCAR). This expense is the sum of the line items Contract and Other for operations 
and maintenance of both water production and distribution. PWC Jacksonville expects 
that this expense will change only as a result of inflation (Bazemore, December 4, 1996). 
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As NAS Cecil Field is scheduled to close in 1998, the operations and maintenance 
expense located in column (0 1) of Table 10 has been reduced from 1999 through 2020 in 
proportion to NAS Cecil Field's annual water consumption, which is calculated for 
scenario 2. It is unlikely that this expense will actually reduce in direct proportion to the 
bases' 16.95 percent share of the Jacksonville Military Complex's annual water 
consumption, because there must be some fixed costs involved. For purposes of this 
thesis, however, it will be assumed that the operations and maintenance will be reduced 
by this amount. 
2. Administrative & Overhead Expense 
These figures are contained in column (02) of Table 10. They were also obtained 
from PWC Jacksonville's FY 1996 UCAR. This expense included the line items titled 
Labor and Overhead for both water production and distribution. Again, PWC 
Jacksonville expects that this number will only increase due to inflation (Bazemore, 
December 4, 1996). The same assumption will be made here as was made above for the 
operations and maintenance expense. A 16.95 percent reduction is calculated in the 
administrative and overhead expense from 1999 through 2020 due to the closure of NAS 
Cecil Field. 
3. Unit Cost of Capital 
This figure, as explained in Chapter IV, is the Government's imputed cost of 
capital. Thus, the value of the system is needed to determine this amount. The Current 
Plant Value (CPV) of the Jacksonville Military Complex's water systems was taken from 
NA VF AC' s P-164 and then reduced by an estimate of accumulated depreciation. 
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Components were depreciated two percent per year since their date of acquisition, as 
water systems are considered to have a 50-year life. The net value of the Jacksonville 
Military Complex's water systems was estimated to be $7,201,816. Table 11 provides 
the details of the unit cost of capital calculation. For this analysis, the annual additions 
are estimated to be 1.75 percent of the plant value (Bazemore, December 2, 1996). 
Additions are included in column (02) of Table 11. Column (03) is a sum of columns 
(01) and (02). This figure is then multiplied by 10 percent to arrive at the unit cost of 
capital, column (05). (Kilway, December 2, 1996). Although Cecil Field will be closing 
in 1998, the Navy will continue to own the system and be responsible for repairs to it 
until it is privatized. Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, it will be assumed that the 
Government maintains ownership of the system throughout the study period. 
4. Net Present Value Calculation for Scenario 1 
The purpose of Table 10 is to calculate the Net Present Value for scenario 1. 
Column (04) of Table 10, total annual outlays, is a sum of columns (01)- (03). This 
value is then multiplied by the middle of the year (MOY) discount factor at 6.8 percent, 
found in column (05) to arrive at the present value of the annual outlays, column (06). 
Finally, the cumulative NPV is calculated in column (07) by summing all of the year's 
present values. The result of the calculations for scenario 1 is a NPV of $34,674,747. 
B. SCENARIO 2- PRIVATIZATION 
This scenario considers privatization of the Jacksonville Military Complex's 
potable water distribution systems. It assumes that a local utility, JEA, will purchase the 
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Table 11. Unit Cost of Capital Calculation - Scenario 1 
Unit Cost 
Year Beginning Additions Ending %Rate of Captial 
(01) 102) (03) (04) (05) 
$ 7,201,816 $ - $ 7,201,816 10% 
1996 $ 7,201,816 $ 126,032 $ 7,327,848 10% $ 732,785 
1997 $ 7,327,848 $ 128,237 $ 7,456,085 10% $ 745,609 
1998 $ 7,456,085 $ 130,481 $ 7,586,567 10% $ 758,657 
1999 $ 7,586,567 $ 132,765 $ 7,719,332 10% $ 771,933 
2000 $ 7,719,332 $ 135,088 $ 7,854,420 10% $ 785,442 
2001 $ 7,854,420 $ 137,452 $ 7,991,872 10% $ 799,187 
2002 $ 7,991,872 $ 139,858 $ 8,131,730 10% $ 813,173 
2003 $ 8,131,730 $ 142,305 $ 8,274,035 10% $ 827,404 
2004 $ 8,274,035 $ 144,796 $ 8,418,831 10% $ 841,883 
2005 $ 8,418,831 $ 147,330 $ 8,566,160 10% $ 856,616 
2006 $ 8,566,160 $ 149,908 $ 8,716,068 10% $ 871,607 
2007 $ 8,716,068 $ 152,531 $ 8,868,599 10% $ 886,860 
2008 $ 8,868,599 $ 155,200 $ 9,023,800 10% $ 902,380 
2009 $ 9,023,800 $ 157,916 $ 9,181,716 10% $ 918,172 
2010 $ 9,181,716 $ 160,680 $ 9,342,396 10% $ 934,240 
2011 $ 9,342,396 $ 163,492 $ 9,505,888 10% $ 950,589 
2012 $ 9,505,888 $ 166,353 $ 9,672,241 10% $ 967,224 
2013 $ 9,672,241 $ 169,264 $ 9,841,506 10% $ 984,151 
2014 $ 9,841,506 $ 172,226 $ 10,013,732 10% $ 1,001,373 
2015 $ 10,013,732 $ 175,240 $ 10,188,972 10% $ 1,018,897 
2016 $ 10,188,972 $ 178,307 $ 10,367,279 10% $ 1,036,728 
2017 $ 10,367,279 $ 181,427 $ 10,548,707 10% $ 1,054,871 
2018 $ 10,548,707 $ 184,602 $ 10,733,309 10% $ 1,073,331 
2019 $ 10,733,309 $ 187,833 $ 10,921,142 10% $ 1,092,114 
2020 $ 10,921,142 $ 191,120 $ 11,112,262 10% $ 1,111,226 
NAS Jacksonville and NAS Cecil Field water systems. This scenario further assumes 
that another local utility, the City of Atlantic Beach, will purchase the NA VST A Mayport 
system. The calculations pertinent to determine the NPV of this scenario are the annual 
water consumption, annual water purchases, and facilities credit. Table 12 contains these 
calculations. 
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Table 12. Life-Cycle Cost Report: Scenario 2-Privatization 
Fiscal Water Facilities Total Annual Middle of Year Present Cumulative 
Year Purchases Credit Outlays Discount Facton Value NPV 
(01) (02) (03) (04) (05) (06) 
1996 $ 1,309,448 $ 1,172,062 $ 137,386 0.968 $ 132,990 $ 132,990 
1997 $ 1,354,827 $ 1,172,062 $ 182,765 0.906 $ 165,585 $ 298,575 
1998 $ 1,405,794 $ 1,172,062 $ 233,732 0.848 $ 198,205 $ 496,n9 
1999 $ 1,262,257 $ 1,172,062 $ 90,195 0.794 $ 71,615 $ 568,394 
2000 $ 1,300,783 $ 1,172,062 $ 128,721 0.744 $ 95,768 $ 664,163 
2001 $ 1,329,400 $ 1,172,062 $ 157,338 0.696 $ 109,507 $ n3,670 
2002 $ 1,358,647 $ 1,172,062 $ 186,585 0.652 $ 121,653 $ 895,323 
2003 $ 1,388,537 $ 1,172,062 $ 216,475 0.611 $ 132,266 $ 1,027,590 
2004 $ 1,419,085 $ 1,172,062 $ 247,023 0.572 $ 141,297 $ 1,168,887 
2005 $ 1,450,305 $ 1,172,062 $ 278,243 0.535 $ 148,860 $ 1,317,747 
2006 $ 1,482,212 $ 0 $ 1,482,212 0.501 $ 742,588 $ 2,060,335 
2007 $ 1,514,820 $ 0 $ 1,514,820 0.469 $ 710,451 $ 2.no,186 
2008 $ 1,548,146 $ 0 $ 1,548,146 0.439 $ 679,636 $ 3,450,422 
-2009 $ 1,582,206 $ 0 $ 1,582,206 0.411 $ 650,287 $ 4,100,708 
2010 $ 1,617,014 $ 0 $ 1,617,014 0.385 $ 622,550 $ 4,723,259 
2011 $ 1,652,588 $ 0 $ 1,652,588 0.361 $ 596,584 $ 5,319,843 
2012 $ 1,688,945 $ 0 $ 1,688,945 0.338 $ 570,863 $ 5,890,706 
2013 $ 1,726,102 $ 0 $ 1,726,102 0.316 $ 545,448 $ 6,436,155 
2014 $ 1,764,076 $ 0 $ 1,764,076 0.296 $ 522,166 $ 6,958,321 
2015 $ 1,802,886 $ 0 $ 1,802,886 o.2n $ 499,399 $ 7,457,721 
2016 $ 1,842,550 $ 0 $ 1,842,550 0.260 $ 479,063 $ 7,936,784 
2017 $ 1,883,086 $ 0 $ 1,883,086 0.243 $ 457,590 $ 8,394,373 
2018 $ 1,924,514 $ 0 $ 1,924,514 0.228 $ 438,789 $ 8,833,163 
2019 $ 1,966,853 $ 0 $ 1,966,853 0.213 $ 418,940 $ 9,252,102 
2020 $ 2,010,124 $ 0 $ 2 010124 0.200 $ 402,025 $ 9,654,127 
1. Annual Water Consumption 
The annual water consumption is the first calculation required for scenario 2, as it 
is needed to calculate the cost of the annual water purchases. This figure is calculated by 
taking the contractor's monthly reports and totaling the FY 1996 potable water 
consumption figures for the three bases. NAS Jacksonville reads consumption at three 
locations: building 127, building 640, and building 2050. NAS Cecil Field records 
consumption at four locations: building 16, building 361, building 609, and building 
3043. NAVSTA Mayport lists consumption at only one well, building 1906. NAVSTA 
Mayport currently purchases water for its off-base activities, including its 400 housing 
units, the Commissary and Navy Exchange Facilities, and the Child Development Center 
59 
from the City of Atlantic Beach. As these purchase levels will not change from scenario 
1 to 2, they are not included in this analysis. Table 13 provides a summary of each 
location's meter size and its consumption level. 
Table 13. Summary of the Jacksonville Military Complex's FY1996 Water 
Consumption per Well Meter 
Meter Location Meter Size Consumption Percent 
NAS Jax- bldg 127 20" 407,348.00 34.51 
NAS Jax- bldg 640 12" 99,196.00 8.40 
NAS Jax- bldg 2050 12" 31,047.90 2.63 
NAVSTA Mypt- bldg 1906 nla 442,650.00 37.50 
NAS Cecil - bldg 16 12" 84,355,520.00 7.15 
NAS Cecil- bldg 361 12" 73,270.15 6.21 
NAS Cecil- bldg 609 12" 8,129.50 0.69 
NAS Cecil - bldg 3043 8" 34,273.85 2.91 
Once the FY 1996 consumption is calculated, estimates are made regarding water 
consumption in the out-years of the life-cycle-analysis. These numbers are provided by 
the Installation Water Resources Analysis and Planning System (IWRAPS) which 
Planning and Management Consultants, Limited., developed while under contract with 
the Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center. 
The !WRAPS program uses typical weather data and planned future construction 
and demolition to project the future water usage. Its annual potable water consumption is 
a direct function of the Base's square footage. As the bases only have plans for 
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construction and demolition for the next 10 years, the consumption estimates do not 
change from the year 2010 through the remainder of the life-cycle. 
The IWRAPS estimates a 4.46 percent increase in NAS Jacksonville's water 
requirements from 1995 to 2000 and a 3.14 percent increase for NAVSTA Mayport 
during this time period. The water requirements are expected to remain constant at the 
2000 level for the remainder of the life-cycle analysis. 
As stated previously, NAS Cecil Field will be closing in 1998. Its current annual 
water consumption is 16.95 percent of the Jacksonville Military Complex's annual water 
consumption. Therefore, the annual water consumption for this analysis, is reduced by 
16.95 percent from 1999 through 2020. 
2. Annual Water Purchases 
After the water consumption was calculated for the duration of the study, the cost 
to purchase this amount of water may be tabulated. These calculations assume that JEA 
will purchase the NAS Jacksonville and NAS Cecil Field potable water distribution 
systems and that the City of Atlantic Beach will purchase the Mayport system. The costs 
will have to be recalculated if the privatization transfers ownership of the systems to other 
companies. 
The annual water purchases, column (01) in Table 12, is calculated for each base 
separately and then added together. For this calculation, NAS Jacksonville and NAS 
Cecil Field will be charged based upon the meter size at each well, in accordance with 
Table 14, JEA water rates. The meter size of these wells was provided in Table 13. 
NA VSTA Mayport will be charged a flat fee based on consumption, as the City of 
61 
Atlantic Beach's charter does not currently permit it to charge customers based upon their 
meter size. The City of Atlantic Beach charges the Navy a flat fee of $6.35 per unit (i.e. 
the Commissary and Exchange are each a unit) which entitles the Navy to three kgal of 
water that month. Thereafter, each kgal of water is charged at $1. 70. This value for 
water purchases is the best that can be calculated. However, if meters were placed at 
individual buildings throughout the bases, consumption at each site would permit 
calculation of a more accurate water purchase cost. Private utilities typically do not 
permit master metering for the base, but require these additional meters be placed at 
individual buildings being serviced. 
Table 14. JEA Water Rates 
Meter Size Monthly Charge Usage Charge (748 gal) 
5/8" $ 8.45 $ 0.63 
3/4" $ 10.65 $ 0.63 
1" $ 15.20 $ 0.63 
1 Yz" $ 26.35 $ 0.63 
2" $ 39.70 $ 0.63 
3" $ 75.35 $ 0.63 
4" $ 115.35 $ 0.63 
6" $ 226.85 $ 0.63 
8" $ 360.35 $ 0.63 
10" $ 516.25 $ 0.47 
12" $ 961.60 $ 0.47 
20" $ 2,009.30 $ 0.47 
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3. Facilities Credit Calculation 
This figure is the annual portion of the estimated fair-market value which will be 
repaid over the ten-year Government contract period, as discussed in Chapter N, by a 
potential buyer of the utility system. As this researcher is not able to solicit bids from 
utilities, the fair-market value is not available. Thus, the Government's CPV for the 
Jacksonville Military Complex's potable water distribution systems was obtained from 
NA VF AC's P-164 and adjusted for accumulated depreciation. This value is the net 
current cost and is used here to represent the fair-market value at which the Government 
would transfer the facilities to private ownership. Details of this calculation are located 
the appendix. A summary of this value is found in Table 15. The result of this facilities 
credit, based upon the adjusted CPV found in Table 15, the ten-year annual facilities 
credit at a 10 percent interest rate was calculated to be $1,172,062. 
Table 15. Summary of CPV for Jacksonville Military Complex's Potable Water 
Distribution Systems 
NAS NAVSTA NAS Cecil Total 
Jacksonville Mayport Field 
CPV from P-164 $28,869,000 $25,746,740 $ 22,362,000 $76,977,740 
Accumulated $ 28,583,240 $19,882,744 $21,309,940 $69,775,924 
Depreciation 
Net Current Costs $285,760 $ 1,052,060 $ 5,863,996 $ 7,201,816 
4. Net Present Value Calculation for Scenario 2 
The NPV calculation is made as follows. Column (03) of Table 12, the scenario 2 
Life-Cycle Report, is total annual outlays. It is the sum of columns (01) and (02) of Table 
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12. This value is then multiplied by the middle of the year (MOY) discount factor at 6.8 
percent, found in column (04) of Table 12 to arrive at the present value of the total annual 
outlays, column (05). Finally, the cumulative NPV is calculated in column (06) of Table 
12 by summing all of the year's present values The NPV for scenario 2 is calculated to be 
$9,654,127. Table 16 summarizes the results of this analysis. 
Table 16. Summary of Jacksonville Military Complex's Potable Water Distribution 
System Life-Cycle Cost Analysis 
Scenario Net Present Value 
1. Status Quo $ 34,674,747 
2. Privatization for CPV $ 9,654,127 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter makes statements of conclusion to the thesis primary and subsidiary 
questions. These statements of conclusion are based upon the researchers literature 
review, interviews conducted, and data gathered and analyzed. This chapter also provides 
recommendations and areas for further research. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Primary Research Question. Is It Economically Beneficial for DoD To 
Privatize the Potable Water Distribution Systems of the Jacksonville 
Military Complex? 
A comparison of the NPV s calculated for scenarios 1 and 2 indicate that it is 
economically beneficial for DoD to privatize the potable water distribution systems of the 
Jacksonville Military Complex. The NPV for scenario 1 was found to be $34,674,747, 
while the NPV of scenario 2 was found to be $9,654,127, for the sales price of 
$7,201,816. Although the Complex will incur the additional cost of water purchases if 
privatization occurs, it will eliminate the current operations and maintenance, 
administrative and overhead, and unit cost of capital expenses and will earn a facilities 
credit. 
2. Subsidiary Question # 1. What are the Circumstances in the Public 
Sector That Give Rise to Privatization? 
Chapter IT lists the circumstances in the public sector that give rise to 
privatization. Chapters m and IV mention the various Congressional requirements to 
65 
- --------------------
achieve privatization and show that politics, not merely economics drive the public 
sector. Government makes some decisions that produce inefficient operating results in 
order to fulfill its mission of serving the people. With the decrease of the Federal 
Discretionary Budget and the emergence of a single world economy, privatization is 
gaining new interest and momentum. The Army has stated that its goal is to privatize 75 
percent of its utility systems by the year 2000 (Eng, 1996, p. 4), as mentioned in Chapter 
ill. 
3. Subsidiary Question #2. What are the Major Impediments to 
Privatization? 
The major impediments to privatization, as discussed in Chapter ill, were found 
to be implementation concerns and Congressional legislation. A specific implementation 
concern is the fact that there is no single model of how to achieve a successful 
privatization. The six techniques that Britain used to privatize numerous assets were 
discussed to provide suggestions for successful privatization in the United States. 
Chapter ill also discussed the need for an interested party and concern over legal liability 
and lack of control which surface when a service is considered for privatization. 
4. Subsidiary Question #3. What Role Does Congress Play in 
Privatization? 
Congress's role in privatization was bundled in three legislative issues in Chapter 
ill: the CIAC tax, authorization level for privatization, and the fair-market value 
determination. As mentioned, this tax was waived for transfers for water or sewage 
disposal services, but not for gas and electric systems. Legislation to correct this 
oversight is not expected to be signed until fiscal year 1999. 
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The Military Services interpret the current utility systems privatization laws 
differently, as discussed in Chapter ill. They have drafted legislative proposals to 
delegate transfer authority for privatization to the level of the Secretary of the Military 
Department. This legislation is expected to be reviewed by Congress in fiscal year 1997 
and would shorten the approval process by approximately two years. 
The third Congressional involvement in privatization mentioned in Chapter ill is 
the requirement to obtain at least fair-market value for the transfer of property. Again, 
the Services are drafting language to submit to Congress which would permit the 
recoupment of the fair-market value of a utility system in any form, including facilities 
credits mentioned in Chapters IV and V, which is beneficial to the Government. 
5. Subsidiary Question #4. What are the Costs/Benefits of Privatizing 
the Potable Water Distribution Systems for NA VWEPSTA Earle? 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the Guernsey study found that privatization at either 
the $1.1 million bid price of NJAWC or the $2 million fair-market value, determined by 
Guernsey, was in the best interest of the Government. The NPV of the potable water 
distribution system was calculated to be 44.6 percent less for the $2 million privatization 
sales price than for the status quo, maintaining Government ownership and operation. 
The $1.1 million privatization sales price was calculated to be 36.1 percent less than the 
status quo. C. H. Guernsey concluded that "privatization actions will provide a cost-
effective means for continued safe and reliable potable water distribution service to the 
Station ... NA VWEPSTA Earle should enter into negotiations with NJA WC to secure a 
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facilities acquisition and service arrangement (C. H. Guernsey & Company, August 1995, 
p. 4-8)." 
6. Subsidiary Question #5. How Do the Costs of Outsourcing the 
Potable Water Distribution Systems for the Jacksonville Military 
Complex Compare To the Costs of Privatization? 
The Jacksonville Military Complex currently outsources its potable water 
distribution systems. Chapter V looked at the current operations as scenario 1 and 
compared them to the costs to privatize the system at a sales price of the CPV, adjusted 
for depreciation, $7,201,816, scenario 2. Calculations performed in Chapter V indicate 
that a 72 percent savings would be realized if these systems were privatized for this 
tabulated CPV. This tabulated figure is not necessarily representative of the value a 
private utility company would be willing to pay for the system. Thus, NPV for scenario 2 
may be understated. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Solicit Bids From Utilities to Determine the System's Fair Value 
Bids should be solicited from utilities concerning the amount they would be 
willing to pay to purchase the potable water distribution systems of the Jacksonville 
Military Complex. Once bids are received, their NPV s should be determined and 
compared with the NPV of the status quo scenario. The scenario with the smaller NPV, 
which is technically capable of providing the service, should be selected. 
68 
2. Develop a New System to Record Plant Value 
The P-164 which NA VFAC uses to list the current plant value (CPV) of its 
systems is difficult to read. Components are listed by the Public Works Center (PWC) 
which services them, however, all components located on one base are not necessarily 
listed together. The reader has to pick through the entire entries for the PWC to be able 
to list components for a base. Also, the P-164 is not updated frequently by the various 
PWCs to reflect the repairs and improvements made nor is depreciation taken into 
account. Therefore, the data in the P-164 is not an accurate account of the value of 
components. A new system which takes depreciation into account and makes it easier for 
field activities to update data is needed and will provide better records. 
3. Install Water Meters at Major Customer's Buildings 
Currently, the potable water requirements for the Jacksonville Military Complex 
are not known. Water consumption is monitored at three wells on NAS Jacksonville, 
four wells on NAS Cecil Field, and one well on NA VSTA Mayport. How much water is 
actually distributed to each customer is not known. Customers are charged for water 
based upon estimates of usage performed in the past. These estimates were derived by 
taking the size of the building, number of employees, and function of the command into 
account. Private utilities tend to charge for water based upon individual meters installed 
at buildings, not master meters. Therefore, to calculate a more realistic price for water 
purchases, if the systems were privatized, consumption at each building would have to be 
known. 
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C. AREA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In order to determine the current value of the Jacksonville Military Complex's 
potable water distribution systems, a physical inventory of the systems would be required 
to determine their current condition. This would entail performing an inventory of the 
pipelines, storage tanks, pumps, etc. and determination of replacement cost, based upon 
the age of the system components. 
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APPENDIX 
Naval Air Station Jacksonville 
Water System Years Since CPV Accumulated Net Current 
Component Acquisition from P-164 Depreciation Costs 
WtrTmt Fac >50 $ 2,646,000 $ 2,646,000 $ -
Wtr Trmnt facil >50 $ 727,000 $ 727,000 $ -
Bldg 20 $ 139,000 $ 55,600 $ 83,400 
Stor Tnk!EI-Pot >50 $ 1,055,000 $ 1,055,000 $ -
Stor Tnk!Gd-Pot >50 $ 689,000 $ 689,000 $ -
WeiVRsrvr-pot >50 $ 382,000 $ 382,000 $ -
Util 15 $ 16,000 $ 4,800 $ 11,200 
Util 16 $ 93,000 $ 29,760 $ 63,240 
Wtr Dist Bldg >50 $ 26,000 $ 26,000 $ -
· Wtr/Dist/Ln/Pot >50 $ 22,540,000 $ 22,540,000 $ -
Tank Fire Prot >50 $ 309,000 $ 309,000 $ -
Wtr Sply/Str Np 39 $ 164,000 $ 36,080 $ 127,920 
Wtr-Sup/Tmt/Stg >50 $ 83,000 $ 83,000 $ -
Sub-total $ 28,869,000 $ 28,583,240 $ 285,760 
Naval Station Mayport 
Water System Years Since CPV Accumulated Net Current 
Component Acquisition from P-164 Depreciation Costs 
New plant 3 $ 4,342,740 $ 260,564 $ 4,082,176 
Water Dist - Pot 5 $ 71,000 $ 7,100 $ 63,900 
WtrTmt Fac 34 $ 518,000 $ 352,240 $ 165,760 
WeiVRsrvr Pot 34 $ 46,000 $ 31,280 $ 14,720 
Wtr/Dist/Ln/Pot >50 $17,647,000 $17,647,000 $ -
Uti I 33 $ 1,115,000 $ 735,900 $ 379,100 
Water-Fire Pro 13 $ 801,000 $ 208,260 $ 592,740 
Wtr Sply/Str N P 34 $ 21,000 $ 14,280 $ 6,720 
Water Dist-Pot 18 $ 278,000 $ 100,080 $ 177,920 
Stor Tank!EI Pot 34 $ 423,000 $ 287,640 $ 135,360 
Stor Tank/Gd Pot 34 $ 232,000 $ 157,760 $ 74,240 
WeiVRsrvr Pot 16 $ 252,000 $ 80,640 $ 171,360 
Sub-total $25,746,740 $19,882,744 $ 5,863,996 
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Naval Air Station Cecil Field 
Water System Years Since CPV Accumulated Net Current 
Component Acquisition from P-164 Depreciation Costs 
Wtr-Supfrmt/Stg 37 $ 4,000 $ 2,960 $ 1,040 
Water Dist-Pot 18 $ 4,000 $ 1,440 $ 2,560 
Wtr Tmt Fac Bid 37 $ 314,000 $ 232,360 $ 81,640 
Wtr Trmnt Facil 19 $ 175,000 $ 66,500 $ 108,500 
Star Tnk/EI Pot 37 $ 173,000 $ 128,020 $ 44,980 
Star Tnk/Gd Pot 19 $ 170,000 $ 64,600 $ 105,400 
Wtr/Dist/Ln/Pot 37 $ 997,000 $ 737,780 $ 259,220 
Util 19 $ 135,000 $ 51,300 $ 83,700 
Wtr Tmt Fac Bid >50 $ 80,000 $ 80,000 $ -
Bldg 40 $ 3,000 $ 2,400 $ 600 
Bldg 19 $ 4,000 $ 1,520 $ 2,480 
Bldg 42 $ 3,000 $ 2,520 $ 480 
Bldg 39 $ 35,000 $ 27,300 $ 7,700 
Bldg 16 $ 4,000 $ 1,280 $ 2,720 
Bldg 24 $ 2,000 $ 960 $ 1,040 
Star Tnk/EI Pot >50 $ 810,000 $ 810,000 $ -
Strc 43 $ 215,000 $ 184,900 $ 30,100 
Star Tnk/Gd Pot >50 $ 207,000 $ 207,000 $ -
Strc 39 $ 297,000 $ 231,660 $ 65,340 
Strc 19 $ 151,000 $ 57,380 $ 93,620 
Bldg 39 $ 158,000 $ 123,240 $ 34,760 
Wtr Dist Bldg 42 $ 50,000 $ 42,000 $ 8,000 
Wtr/Dist/Ln/Pot >50 $ 18,015,000 $ 18,015,000 $ . 
Water-Fire Pro 33 $ 125,000 $ 107,500 $ 17,500 
WeiVRsrvr Pot 39 $ 4,000 $ 3,120 $ 880 
Uti I 28 $ 11,000 $ 6,160 $ 4,840 
Mains Pmp/Fac 36 $ 60,000 $ 43,200 $ 16,800 
Star Tnk/Gd Pot 28 $ 11,000 $ 6,160 $ 4,840 
WeiVRsrvr Pot 28 $ 43,000 $ 24,080 $ 18,920 
Util 39 $ 26,000 $ 5,720 $ 20,280 
Water-Fire Pro 28 $ 61,000 $ 34,160 $ 26,840 
Wtr-Supfrmt/Stg 35 $ 3,000 $ 2,100 $ 900 
Water Dist- Pot 33 $ 2,000 $ 1,320 $ 680 
Wtr/Dist/Ln/Pot 8 $ 5,000 $ 800 $ 4,200 
Water Dist - Pot 33 $ 5,000 $ 3,500 $ 1,500 
Sub-total $ 22,362,000 $ 21 ,309,940 $ 1,052,060 
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